Bond v. Saul
2:20-cv-00361
E.D. Wis.Jan 12, 2021Background
- Bond alleged disability beginning February 14, 2017 and applied for disability insurance benefits; application denied initially and on reconsideration; ALJ hearing held February 27, 2019.
- ALJ found severe impairments: depression, anxiety, and headaches; did not find a listing-level impairment.
- ALJ assigned an RFC allowing work at all exertional levels but imposing many non‑exertional limits (no loud/bright flashing lights, no hazardous work or ladders, simple/routine tasks, no multitasking, no direct public service, limited interaction with coworkers/supervisors, average production pace).
- ALJ found Bond could not do her past work but, relying on VE testimony, could perform jobs existing in the national economy (e.g., cleaner, laundry worker); ALJ therefore denied benefits.
- Bond challenged the decision in district court, arguing the ALJ improperly discounted treating-source opinions, failed to account for variable functioning (bipolar disorder) in the RFC, and mishandled medication side effects.
- The court reversed and remanded, finding the ALJ erred in discounting two treating mental‑health opinions and in assessing medication side effects; the ALJ’s rejection of the primary‑care opinion was upheld and the step‑two omission for bipolar disorder was harmless because the RFC accounted for variability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weight given to treating psychiatrist Dr. James Winston’s opinion | Winston’s opinions reflecting marked work limitations and frequent absences are supported by his treatment notes and should not have been given little weight | ALJ properly discounted opinions as inconsistent with overall record and based largely on subjective reports | Court: ALJ erred in discounting Winston; he overstated frequency of visits and overlooked objective notes supporting Winston’s findings, so little‑weight rationale not supported by substantial evidence (remand) |
| Weight given to treating therapist Christine Hansburg‑Hotson’s opinion | Therapist’s November 2018 opinion of major limitations is supported by therapy records and Winston’s findings | ALJ reasonably rejected the degree of limitations for the same reasons stated for Winston | Court: ALJ failed to analyze Hansburg‑Hotson’s opinion separately and did not support rejection with substantial evidence (remand) |
| Weight given to treating primary‑care Dr. Gerald Ignace’s headache opinion | Ignace’s opinion that migraines require lying down 8–10 hours and meet Listing 11.03 is supported by migraine journal and clinical familiarity | ALJ permissibly discounted it because it relied largely on plaintiff’s self‑reports, notes show improvement with medication, and Ignace is not a headache specialist | Court: ALJ’s reasons for giving little weight to Ignace were reasonable and supported (no error) |
| RFC and variable functioning (bipolar disorder) | ALJ ignored bipolar disorder and evidence of decompensation; RFC did not adequately account for fluctuating functioning | ALJ acknowledged fluctuations and incorporated multiple non‑exertional limits into RFC; omission at step two was harmless | Court: failure to list bipolar at step two was harmless because RFC accounted for symptom variability; no reversible error on that ground |
| Medication side effects (Seroquel causing sleepiness) | ALJ relied on too few notes; records show multiple notations of sedating effects and decreased energy requiring consideration in RFC | Commissioner: ALJ permissibly inferred side effects were not consistent because later visits did not document ongoing sleepiness | Court: ALJ’s inference not supported—treatment notes show "decreased energy" repeatedly; ALJ did not cite substantial evidence to conclude side effect was not a consistent problem (remand) |
Key Cases Cited
- L.D.R. by Wagner v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2019) (standard of review—affirm if correct legal standards and substantial evidence)
- Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2011) (substantial‑evidence review)
- Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2017) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2010) (substantial‑evidence standard)
- Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2019) (court will not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment)
- Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2003) (court’s limited role in credibility and factfinding)
- Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2008) (reasonable minds may differ but court affirms if supported by substantial evidence)
- Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2009) (factors for weighing treating‑physician opinions)
- Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299 (7th Cir. 2010) (ALJ must give good reasons for discounting treating opinions)
- Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2015) (courts will uphold all but patently erroneous reasons for discounting treating opinions)
- Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 2016) (treating‑source controlling‑weight framework)
- Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015) (harmless‑error analysis for step‑two omission)