Bond v. Bond
2011 ME 105
| Me. | 2011Background
- Lynda and Christopher Bond were married in 1981 and filed for divorce in 2008.
- The district court appointed a referee under Rule 119 and 19-A M.R.S. § 252 to hear the divorce case.
- The referee conducted a four-day hearing in February 2010 and filed a thirty-two page amended report in August 2010; judgment incorporating the report was entered in September 2010.
- Twenty-two days after the divorce judgment, Lynda filed two post-judgment motions (Rule 60(b) and omitted property) and sought to have them heard before the same referee.
- Christopher opposed, arguing the court could not refer the post-judgment motions to the referee without his renewed consent under Rule 119; the court referred the motions to the referee for judicial economy.
- Christopher appealed the court’s second order of reference as interlocutory, challenging the propriety of referring post-judgment motions to a referee over objection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal is proper under the final judgment rule. | Bond argues interlocutory appeal permissible under exceptions. | Bond argues excepciones are inapplicable; final judgment rule should apply. | Appeal dismissed; no applicable exception reached. |
| Whether death knell exception applies to allow immediate review. | Death knell preserved rights to de novo fact determination by court, not referee. | No irreparable harm; review can occur after final judgment. | Death knell exception inapplicable. |
| Whether collateral order exception permits immediate review. | The issue is collateral and separable from underlying divorce; immediate review warranted to avoid irreparable loss. | No irreparable loss if reviewed after final judgment; issues can be addressed later. | Collateral order exception not applicable as to this appeal. |
| Whether judicial economy exception justifies an interlocutory appeal. | Interlocutory review would prevent unnecessary duplication and delay. | Judicial economy cannot override lack of exceptional circumstances. | Judicial economy exception not satisfied; appeal dismissed. |
| Whether the court had authority to appoint a referee over objection under Rule 119/19-A § 252(1)(B). | Court lacked exceptional circumstances; needed consent to refer post-judgment motions to referee. | Court acted to promote judicial economy with requisite authority. | Court's referenced action not warranted; appeal dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71 (Me. 2009) (final judgment rule exceptions analysis and irreparable harm concept)
- Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38 (Me. 2011) (final judgment rule and interlocutory review guidance)
- Williams v. Williams, 1998 ME 32 (Me. 1998) (interlocutory review and reference opinions in family matters)
- Mahaney v. Miller's, Inc., 669 A.2d 165 (Me. 1995) (precedent on interlocutory appeals and references over objection)
- Liberty v. Liberty, 2001 ME 19 (Me. 2001) (collateral order and irreparable loss standard)
- Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Christensen, 1999 ME 160 (Me. 1999) (collateral order doctrine and review availability)
- Pierce v. Grove Mfg. Co., 576 A.2d 196 (Me. 1990) (final judgment rule and related principles)