272 P.3d 1263
Idaho2012Background
- Bollinger, hired in 1988 as cashier/receptionist, became Energy Auditor in 1993 and later Safety & Loss/Facility Director until termination in July 2009.
- Fall River's termination policy changed multiple times; 2004 policy created for-cause framework superseded by a 2009 Employment-At-Will policy issued April 6, 2009 to all employees, including Bollinger.
- Bollinger received the 2009 at-will policy; court notes she accepted by continuing to work; she asserts a prior for-cause policy might still apply.
- Termination occurred in a broader 2009 workforce reduction including an early retirement program and reassignment of Bollinger’s duties due to budgetary/ economic concerns; minutes reference economic conditions.
- Bollinger alleged an employment contract and claimed safety-related issues were improperly ignored; she presented no contract or specific enforceable promise at summary judgment.
- District Court granted summary judgment for Fall River on all claims; Bollinger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract despite at-will status | Bollinger relied on a promised contract/specified terms from older policies. | Bollinger was at-will under 2009 policy; prior for-cause policy superseded. | Bollinger was at-will; no contract impliedly limited discharge. |
| Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing | Fall River acted in bad faith to terminate Bollinger to target her safety reporting. | No contractual duty to terminate for cause; policy change was proper, not retaliatory. | No breach; covenant not violated. |
| Retaliatory discharge/public policy protection | Termination violated public policy for safety reporting. | No protected activity established and discharge tied to economic consolidation. | Public policy exception not shown; summary judgment affirmed. |
| NIED and IIED claims viability | Termination caused emotional distress; NIED/IIED supported by conduct. | At-will termination does not create duty; distress claims lack evidence of physical manifestations or outrageous conduct. | NIED dismissed; IIED fails as conduct not extreme or outrageous. |
| Attorney fees on appeal | Entitled to fees as prevailing party. | Not the prevailing party; Rule 41 governs fee requests and none awarded. | No attorney fees on appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233 (2005) (employment at-will presumption unless written contract or implied limitation exists)
- Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709 (1994) (at-will presumption and contractual limits on discharge must be evidenced)
- Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 111 Idaho 44 (1986) (employer may change at-will status by notice and continued employment)
- Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622 (1989) (policies may imply terms if intended to become part of the contract)
- Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 141 Idaho 754 (2005) (NIED claims require a duty; termination of at-will employee alone is not a breach)
- Ray v. Nampa School Dist., 120 Idaho 117 (1991) (protected activity can arise where public policy is served by reporting violations)
- Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prod., 139 Idaho 172 (2003) (public policy analysis in at-will termination contexts)
- Roe v. Albertson's, Inc., 141 Idaho 524 (2005) (workers' compensation exclusive remedy; NIED may proceed if not so premised)
- Thomas v. Med. Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200 (2002) (protected activity analysis and public policy tolls)