Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC
53 Cal. App. 5th 431
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2020Background
- Plaintiff Angela Bolger bought a replacement laptop battery on Amazon sold under the seller name “E‑Life” (Lenoge). The battery later exploded and caused severe burns.
- The battery was part of Amazon’s Fulfilled by Amazon (FBA) program: Lenoge shipped inventory to an Amazon warehouse, Amazon stored, listed, took payment, packaged (Amazon‑branded) and shipped the item to Bolger.
- Bolger sued Amazon and others for strict products liability, negligence, and warranty claims; some foreign defendants defaulted or were difficult to serve. The trial court granted Amazon summary judgment, ruling Amazon was merely a marketplace/ service provider and not a seller or distributor.
- On appeal Bolger argued Amazon was part of the chain of distribution and should be strictly liable; Amazon argued it was protected by the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) and was only a marketplace facilitator.
- The Court of Appeal reversed: Amazon’s control over listing terms, possession, payment processing, packaging, returns, and its ability to police sellers made it an integral link in the distribution chain and potentially strictly liable; § 230 did not bar the claims because liability was based on Amazon’s own conduct, not publisher status.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of strict products liability to Amazon for a third‑party product sold via FBA | Amazon was a direct link in distribution: it stored, listed, billed, packaged, shipped, and controlled seller terms — thus subject to strict liability | Amazon was only a service/marketplace provider, not a manufacturer/ distributor/seller, so strict liability should not apply | Reversed. Under these facts Amazon was an integral part of the producing/marketing enterprise and summary adjudication of strict liability was improper; triable issues remain |
| CDA § 230 immunity | Plaintiff: § 230 does not apply because claim is based on Amazon’s own conduct in the distribution chain, not on publishing third‑party content | Amazon: § 230 shields online intermediaries from liability for third‑party listings (publisher/speaker immunity) | Held for Plaintiff. § 230 does not shield Amazon because the claims target Amazon’s conduct as a distributor/seller, not its role as publisher of third‑party content |
| Relevance of traditional seller/distributor definitions (title transfer, selection, control) | Bolger: formal title or dictionary definitions should not defeat strict liability where Amazon exercises control and plays retail functions | Amazon: it did not take title, set price, or select products and thus cannot be a seller/distributor for strict liability purposes | Held for Plaintiff. Court applies function/policy‑based test (Vandermark/Greenman) over formal title tests; Amazon’s operational control is dispositive here |
| Summary judgment standard / remedy on remand | Bolger argued trial court improperly resolved material factual disputes on summary judgment | Amazon argued its evidence established no triable issue | Court reversed. Trial court must vacate summary judgment, deny summary adjudication of strict liability claims, grant summary adjudication of the narrow claims previously decided for Amazon, and proceed consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57 (1963) (establishes strict products liability doctrine)
- Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256 (1964) (extends strict liability to retailers/distributors as integral parts of marketing enterprise)
- Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 (1978) (explains public‑policy basis for strict liability)
- Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal.3d 245 (1970) (broad application of strict liability to market realities)
- Jimenez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 473 (2002) (use of strict liability policies to assess novel distribution contexts)
- O'Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal.4th 335 (2012) (limits on applying strict liability where defendant lacks causal connection to product)
- Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal.App.2d 44 (1965) (intermediary held within strict liability scope despite not holding product at all times)
- Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 228 (1968) (strict liability applied to distributor/installer even without formal sale)
- Peterson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.4th 1185 (1995) (limits on strict liability where policy considerations do not support extension)
- Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co., 51 Cal.App.4th 762 (1996) (discusses application of strict liability to vertical distribution participants)