Boisvert v. Gavis
210 A.3d 1
Conn.2019Background
- Maternal grandparents (Boisvert) filed a petition under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 seeking visitation with their grandson B after the mother died and the father (Gavis) obtained custody.
- The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the grandparents had a parent-like relationship with B and that denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm, and granted visitation (weekends for grandmother; Wednesdays for grandfather) with limited terms.
- The father terminated visitation unilaterally, later offered a much smaller, unilateral visitation schedule, and repeatedly refused to comply with the court order; the trial court found him in contempt twice and imposed remedial sanctions.
- Postjudgment, the father sought a no-contact term prohibiting B’s contact with the maternal aunt (Riddell) and argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because his voluntary offer mooted the dispute; he also argued the visitation order must affirmatively require third parties to follow a fit parent’s decisions and that the quantity of visitation violated his due process rights.
- The trial court denied the no-contact motion and motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; this Court consolidated appeals and affirmed the trial court on all issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the father’s postjudgment voluntary offer of reduced visitation divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction or moot the action? | Plaintiffs: offer was not bona fide and did not moot an order entered after Roth-compliant findings. | Gavis: his offer eliminated the deprivation of visitation, so the court lost jurisdiction / case became moot. | Held: Offer did not divest jurisdiction or moot the action; father failed heavy burden to show voluntary cessation would not recur. |
| Must § 46b-59 or due process require a term directing third parties to follow a fit parent’s decisions during visitation? | Plaintiffs: statute and due process permit courts to set terms under best-interest framework; no absolute command required. | Gavis: order must include an affirmative requirement that third parties abide by a fit parent’s decisions re: care, education, health, religion, associations. | Held: Neither § 46b-59 nor due process requires such a broad provision; courts may tailor terms and must give special weight to parental preferences on fundamental matters when raised in good faith. |
| Was the trial court required to enter a no-contact order re: aunt (Riddell) to protect parental rights? | Plaintiffs: no evidence aunt posed risk; request untimely and unsupported. | Gavis: constitutional right to control child’s associations justified no-contact order. | Held: Father’s request was untimely and nonspecific; trial court properly denied it for lack of evidence and explanation. |
| Does the amount/duration of visitation ordered violate the father’s fundamental parental rights (as-applied challenge)? | Plaintiffs: visitation was narrowly tailored to prevent real and significant harm and implement Roth factors. | Gavis: the amount exceeded what strict scrutiny permits and unconstitutionally interferes with parental rights. | Held: Court declined to review under Golding—the record is inadequate and trial court did not make particularized findings about why that amount was necessary; issue not preserved for appellate review. |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality) (establishes parental due-process presumption and cautions against broad nonparental visitation statutes)
- Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 (2002) (Connecticut requires third parties to prove by clear and convincing evidence a parent-like relationship and that denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm)
- DiGiovanna v. St. George, 300 Conn. 59 (2011) (trial courts craft terms/conditions under § 46b-59 to implement visitation once Roth factors are met)
- Denardo v. Bergamo, 272 Conn. 500 (2005) (addressed retroactive application of Roth to pre-Roth orders; distinguished here)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (voluntary cessation exception to mootness; heavy burden to show offending conduct will not recur)
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989) (framework for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
