Bohannan, Michael Wayne, PD-0347-15

Background

Bohannan was civilly committed as an SVP under Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 841 in 2009 and required GPS monitoring and residential rules. Several "bracelet gone" alerts (2009) and later incidents (2011) were charged as violations.
The Ninth Court of Appeals (2010) reversed the civil-commitment judgment because the trial court excluded a defense expert; the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that reversal in 2012 (mandate issued Jan. 18, 2013).
While the commitment appeal was pending and after the appellate reversal, the State re‑indicted Bohannan in Montgomery County (2011 and again in 2012) for alleged violations of the (reversed) commitment order; later enhancement paragraphs raised exposure to life imprisonment.
At the 2013 criminal trial Bohannan sought to represent himself; the trial court denied pro se requests and appointed counsel (disputed whether counsel was accepted for this specific cause).
Trial court granted State's motion in limine limiting references to the commitment reversal; Bohannan asserted a mistake-of-law defense but did not ultimately present the foundational testimony the court excluded. Jury convicted and assessed life; the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion (Oct. 29, 2014).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Bohannan)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether trial court erred in denying motion to quash and trying Bohannan for violating a commitment order that had been reversed on appeal	Reversal by appellate courts meant the commitment was invalid; proceeding to try him for violations (including an April 24, 2011 act that occurred after reversal) violated due process (Vitek) and could not support criminal punishment	The commitment order was effective on entry under §841.081(a); reversal was not enforceable until the Supreme Court's mandate issued, so the order remained in effect during the alleged offenses	Court of Appeals: no error; indictment not quashed because order was effective and mandate had not issued for reversal at time of offenses (affirmed)
Whether trial court improperly denied Bohannan his right to represent himself at trial	Bohannan repeatedly and clearly asserted his Faretta right in pro se filings and communications; trial judges failed to give Faretta admonitions and improperly rejected requests without hearings	The record shows Bohannan accepted appointed counsel in earlier proceedings and filed pro se motions while represented; the court was not required to entertain hybrid representation; assertions were not treated as a clear, unequivocal Faretta demand	Court of Appeals: no abuse of discretion; defendant accepted counsel and did not timely make an unequivocal pro se demand before jury empanelment (affirmed)
Whether Bohannan had a right to proceed pro se on appeal	Bohannan argued he sought to represent himself on appeal (citing art. 1.051 and prior authority) and the trial court's imposition of appellate counsel prevented consideration of his pro se claims	State and court treated appellate counsel as properly appointed and refused to consider pro se filings while he was represented	Court of Appeals did not grant relief on this ground; the opinion treats appointment/representation as proper and declined to consider pro se claims while counsel represented appellant
Whether the trial court improperly granted the State's motion in limine and prevented Bohannan from presenting the factual basis for a mistake-of-law defense	Bohannan relied on appellate statements and state officials' representations that the commitment had been reversed; exclusion of foundational testimony prevented presentation of the statutory mistake-of-law defense	The trial court conditioned admissibility on proffer/testimony outside jury presence and did not exclude testimony outright; no ruling sustaining an evidentiary objection occurred after a proper offer of proof to preserve error	Court of Appeals: no reversible error; defendant failed to preserve the exclusion claim because testimony was not properly offered and ruled upon (affirmed)

Key Cases Cited

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (due process required before imposing stigmatizing, qualitatively different conditions)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (criminal defendant has right to self-representation when clearly and unequivocally asserted)
Ex parte Jimenez, 361 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (elements of an offense are proved as they existed when the offense occurred; prior judgments may be used if effective at time of conduct)
Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing custody and derogation rules in post‑conviction contexts)
Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004) (addressing due process implications in confinement and collateral consequences)
Ex parte Evan, 338 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (due process review where civil commitment procedures and consequences at issue)