1:17-cv-09362
N.D. Ill.Sep 20, 2018Background
- In 2008 Mark Simon sued Constantino Boccarsi and others in Arizona state court alleging securities fraud, common-law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation based on representations that Simon’s funds would be invested in a stock‑trading program that never lost money.
- Simon invested $200,000 in 2006 after representations that the program would generate short‑term profits; defendants never invested the funds and returned only $34,000; state court claims against the Debtors proceeded and their answer was struck after they failed to appear.
- On November 24, 2010 the Arizona court entered a default judgment against the Debtors, awarding Simon $243,359 (final judgment amended May 19, 2011).
- The Debtors filed Chapter 7 in 2016; Simon brought an adversary action seeking a determination that the state‑court judgment debt was non‑dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).
- The Bankruptcy Court granted Simon summary judgment, concluding the default judgment qualified as a “judgment” under § 523(a)(19) and the state‑court complaint’s allegations (deemed admitted) established a violation of Arizona securities law.
- The district court affirmed, holding the complaint adequately pled securities fraud under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44‑1991 and that § 523(a)(19)’s “any judgment” language requires giving preclusive effect to the default judgment for dischargeability purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state‑court default judgment qualifies as a “judgment” under § 523(a)(19) such that the debt may be non‑dischargeable | Simon: § 523(a)(19) applies to “any judgment,” so the default judgment is sufficient | Debtors: default judgments lack ordinary preclusive effect and thus should not trigger § 523(a)(19) | Held: § 523(a)(19) alters normal collateral estoppel rules; default judgment counts as a “judgment” for § 523(a)(19) purposes |
| Whether the state‑court complaint (deemed admitted by default) sufficiently alleges a violation of Arizona securities law | Simon: complaint alleges material false statements about the investment program and lack of any program—satisfies § 44‑1991 and Arizona Rule 9(b) pleading requirements | Debtors: complaint failed to plead securities fraud with required particularity and thus did not establish a § 44‑1991 violation | Held: Allegations are sufficiently particular and state a securities‑fraud claim under § 44‑1991 |
| Whether scienter is required to prove a § 44‑1991 violation based on false statements | Simon: scienter not required for claims based on false or misleading statements under § 44‑1991 | Debtors: argue scienter must be pled with particularity | Held: Scienter is not an element for false‑statement claims under § 44‑1991; not required here |
| Whether the debt resulting from the default judgment is non‑dischargeable under § 523(a)(19) | Simon: debt arises from a state securities law violation memorialized in a judgment, so nondischargeable | Debtors: contest the sufficiency of the state‑court pleadings and preclusive effect | Held: Debt is non‑dischargeable under § 523(a)(19) because the judgment established a securities‑law violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Stamat v. Neary, 635 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.) (standard of review for bankruptcy appeals)
- Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir.) (statutory language requiring preclusive effect for “any” judgment, including defaults)
- Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (securities‑fraud liability can encompass schemes where funds are misappropriated rather than invested)
- Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (bankruptcy discharge policy and exceptions)
- Circle K. Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 880 P.2d 642 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (default judgments generally lack preclusive effect under Arizona law)
- Aaron v. Fromkin, 994 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (materiality and no scienter required for false‑statement violations of § 44‑1991)
- Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 318 P.3d 419 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (pleading standard for fraud under Arizona law)
- Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir.) (permissibility of inconsistent legal theories in pleadings)
