367 P.3d 84
Ariz. Ct. App.2016Background
- Husband and Wife divorced by a June 2014 decree that awarded Wife $1,174,072.90 for her marital interest in a Snowmass, Colorado home (per the premarital agreement) plus $129,341.10 reimbursement for living expenses, for a total of $1,303,414.00.
- Decree gave Husband seven days to elect either a lump-sum payment or a ten-year payment plan (initial cash payment $370,658.90 plus a 10-year promissory note for the balance).
- Husband appealed and asked the family court to set the supersedeas bond; he proposed a bond limited to amounts immediately owing under the payment plan (~$541,792.40, later $585,125.78 with interest).
- Family court set the supersedeas bond at $1,303,414.00, i.e., the full amount of the Decree award, and rejected Husband’s argument that the bond should be limited to amounts currently due under the payment plan.
- Husband sought special action relief; the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and denied relief, holding A.R.S. § 12-2108 and ARCAP 7 require a bond equal to the total amount of the award.
Issues
| Issue | Husband's Argument | Wife's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.R.S. § 12-2108 and ARCAP 7 require a supersedeas bond equal to the full decree award in a divorce case | The statute only covers "damages" and family-law awards are not damages; bond should be limited to amounts currently due under the payment plan | The statute applies to family-law judgments and requires bond equal to total amount awarded to preserve status quo and protect Wife from dissipation | Held: Bond must be set at the total amount of damages awarded (full decree amount), as statute and rule plainly require that amount |
| Whether a promissory note or installment schedule substitutes for a supersedeas bond | Promissory note/installment obligations are not equivalent to bond; only amounts currently due should be bonded | Trial-court order and statutory language require bond in full amount regardless of installment terms | Held: Execution of a note is not equivalent to bond; bond must cover the full awarded amount |
| Whether setting a full-award bond improperly accelerates the Decree or substantively alters remedies | Full bond would effectively accelerate the lump-sum judgment and change parties’ positions | Supersedeas bond preserves status quo and does not permanently accelerate the award; bond is returnable if appellant prevails | Held: Setting full-award bond does not substantively accelerate the Decree; it preserves status quo pending appeal |
| Whether Wife is entitled to attorney fees on appeal in this special action | (Husband did not assert) Husband opposed fee award | Wife requested fees but cited no statutory or rule basis | Held: Denied attorney fees for Wife; costs allowed under ARCAP 21 if properly claimed |
Key Cases Cited
- City Ctr. Exec. Plaza, LLC v. Jantzen, 237 Ariz. 37 (App. 2015) (special-action standards and appellate rule interpretation)
- Cranmer v. State, 204 Ariz. 299 (App. 2003) (de novo review for statutory and rule interpretation)
- Thielking v. Kirschner, 176 Ariz. 154 (App. 1993) (harmonizing procedural rules with related statutes)
- Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427 (App. 2005) (plain-language approach to statutes and rules)
- Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. Corp. v. Desert Valley Wood Prods., Inc., 179 Ariz. 456 (1994) (definition and purpose of actual damages)
- United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Davis, 3 Ariz. App. 259 (App. 1966) (actual damages restore injured party to pre-injury position)
- Porter v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 112 Ariz. 491 (1975) (purpose of supersedeas bond is to preserve status quo)
- Freeman v. Wintroath Pumps-Div. of Worthington Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 182 (1970) (bond protects against dissipation of funds during appeal)
- Anderson v. Pickrell, 115 Ariz. 589 (1977) (requirement of supersedeas bond in divorce context)
- Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239 (1975) (post-judgment payment issues and bond in family-law appeals)
- In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546 (App. 2008) (giving effect to legislative intent in family-law statutory interpretation)
- Bank One, Arizona, N.A. v. Beauvais, 188 Ariz. 245 (1997) (denial of attorney fees where no statutory or rule basis cited)