Bobby Sheppard v. Norm Robinson, 807 F.3d 815

Background

In 1994 Bobby Sheppard was convicted of murder and sentenced to death; the jury heard mitigation testimony that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.
After the penalty verdict, juror Stephen Fox disclosed calling Helen Jones during deliberations and receiving a lay definition of schizophrenia; the trial court held an in‑chambers hearing and found no prejudice.
State courts denied a new trial and multiple postconviction petitions; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct and state postconviction review.
Sheppard filed a federal habeas petition raising, among other claims, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert or juror testimony to rebut Jones’s description; a federal evidentiary hearing later elicited testimony from Fox and Jones that conflicted with earlier statements.
The district court denied habeas relief (and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in Sheppard v. Bagley); after Martinez v. Ryan was decided, Sheppard moved under Rule 60(b) to reopen his habeas judgment claiming Martinez excused his procedural default.
The district court denied Rule 60(b) relief; the Sixth Circuit majority affirmed, treating parts of the motion as a successive petition and concluding Martinez did not present the "extraordinary circumstances" required to reopen under Rule 60(b)(6).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sheppard's Rule 60(b) motion is a "second or successive" habeas petition	The motion merely seeks to excuse procedural default in the original habeas action under Martinez and thus is non‑successive	The motion attempts to add new grounds and relitigate claims already or not previously raised, so it is successive under § 2244(b)	Motion was partly successive: claims not raised in the original petition (additional alleged omissions) are successive and not considered; but challenge to the district court's procedural‑default ruling on previously raised claims is non‑successive and considered
Whether Martinez creates an "extraordinary circumstance" under Rule 60(b)(6) warranting reopening	Martinez announced a narrow equitable exception excusing procedural default caused by ineffective postconviction counsel, so it justifies reopening	Martinez is not sufficiently extraordinary; it did not overrule Coleman and is not unusual enough to reopen a final habeas judgment, especially given Sheppard’s lack of diligence	Martinez does not constitute extraordinary circumstances to reopen Sheppard’s final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)
Whether Sheppard was diligent in raising Martinez to the Supreme Court during certiorari period	Sheppard filed for certiorari after Martinez but did not mention Martinez; he argues later reliance on Martinez should excuse default	Government and court contend Sheppard was not diligent—he failed to alert the Supreme Court when Martinez was issued before his cert petition—so Gonzalez controls	Lack of diligence forecloses Rule 60(b)(6) relief; Gonzalez requires that a movant who failed to seek timely relief not receive reopening based on intervening case law
Whether factual additions (Fox’s and Jones’s later admissions) may be considered now	Sheppard contends the later admissions show prejudice and ineffective assistance of trial counsel warranting relief	Government contends those specific omissions were not raised in the original habeas and so are new grounds barred as successive	Court refused to consider the new factual omissions because they were not part of the original habeas and would make the motion successive

Key Cases Cited

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (announcing narrow equitable exception to Coleman for ineffective assistance at initial‑review collateral proceedings)
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (applying Martinez to certain Texas cases where state procedure prevented raising ineffective‑trial‑counsel claims)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) motion treated as successive petition when it asserts or seeks to add new claims; distinguishes non‑merits Rule 60(b) challenges)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default doctrine; ineffective‑assistance‑of‑postconviction‑counsel generally not an exception)
Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2011) (prior Sixth Circuit opinion declining to consider federal evidentiary‑hearing testimony under § 2254(e)(2))
Henness v. Bagley, 766 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding Martinez/Trevino not "extraordinary" for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes in capital case)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (emphasizing state interests in finality in federal habeas review)