Bobby Scott Culberson v. Tammi Letitia Culberson, 196 So. 3d 1062

Scott and Tammi Culberson divorced in 2005; Tammi had physical custody of two daughters (then teenagers/young adults).
In 2013 Tammi filed a contempt petition claiming Scott was behind on child support and certain educational/medical expenses and sought to increase obligations. Scott counterfiled for contempt alleging denied visitation and sought termination of support because daughters would not speak with him.
Over three hearing days (spanning ~1 year) the parties agreed in open court in Feb 2014 that Scott and the daughters would attend counseling and that Scott’s support would be voluntary; the chancellor approved but no written order was entered implementing the agreement.
After the oral agreement Scott stopped paying many previously ordered obligations; Tammi moved for contempt and enforcement. The chancellor found Scott in contempt for unpaid support that accrued prior to Tammi’s contempt filing, awarded $2,500 attorney’s fees on that portion, and declined contempt for post-agreement nonpayment.
The chancellor ruled the unpaid support that fell during the period of the un-entered oral agreement remained legally owing because no court order modified the obligation, and he modified visitation to allow visitation only when mutually agreed (children could not be compelled).

Issue	Culberson (Appellant) Argument	Culberson (Appellee) / Tammi Argument	Held
Contempt for nonpayment of support	He should not be held in contempt for arrears because parties agreed support would be voluntary from Feb 2014	Contempt proper for arrears that accrued before Tammi’s contempt filing; post-agreement nonpayment not basis for contempt	Court affirmed: contempt finding limited to pre-filing arrears; no contempt for post-February obligations (chancellor’s bench ruling and written judgment)
Back child support during oral agreement period / nunc pro tunc relief	The oral, court‑approved agreement made support voluntary; chancellor should have entered order (or nunc pro tunc) excusing retroactive payments	Because no order was entered on the minutes, the obligation continued; extrajudicial modification unenforceable	Affirmed: issue procedurally barred on appeal and, substantively, court cannot ignore absence of formal order—support remained due absent an entered judgment (Brewer precedent)
Visitation modification	He sought either court-compelled visits or termination of support if daughters refused to visit	Visitation schedule had not worked for years; forcing visits would be counterproductive; children wished to reconnect but at their pace	Affirmed: chancellor did not abuse discretion modifying visitation to allow unlimited visitation only when agreed by children; modification was in children’s best interest given circumstances

Yelverton v. Yelverton, 961 So. 2d 19 (Miss. 2007) (standard of appellate review for chancery decisions in divorce-related matters)
Carambat v. Carambat, 72 So. 3d 505 (Miss. 2011) (chancellor’s factual findings given deference)
Joel v. Joel, 43 So. 3d 424 (Miss. 2010) (appellate court will not disturb findings supported by substantial evidence)
Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 2005) (assumption that chancellor resolved factual issues in favor of appellee when specific findings absent)
Irving v. Irving, 67 So. 3d 776 (Miss. 2011) (questions of law reviewed de novo)
Fowler v. White, 85 So. 3d 287 (Miss. 2012) (appellate courts generally will not consider issues raised for first time on appeal)
Brewer v. Holiday, 135 So. 3d 117 (Miss. 2014) (court must enter judgment to modify child support; extrajudicial modification is at party’s peril)
Shumake v. Shumake, 147 So. 3d 352 (Miss. 2014) (chancellor not required to enter nunc pro tunc order implementing unentered agreement)
Ellis v. Ellis, 840 So. 2d 806 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (standard for modifying visitation: prior decree not working and modification in child’s best interest)
Ross v. Segrest, 421 So. 2d 1234 (Miss. 1982) (a child’s wishes are not binding on the court, but may be considered)