Bobby Johnson v. Juan Enriquez, 460 S.W.3d 669

Plaintiff Bobby Johnson sued Juan Enriquez after allegedly suffering a puncture wound to his left thigh from a dog bite while walking by Enriquez’s home on April 27, 2010; Johnson sought damages under negligence, negligence per se, premises liability, and strict liability theories.
Enriquez owned two St. Bernards (Daisy and Beethoven) and a Basset Hound; the dogs could roam a front patio enclosed by a wrought-iron fence with ~6-inch vertical gaps, to which Enriquez attached screening (chicken-wire) by wire that frequently fell down.
Johnson testified he felt a sharp sting, saw blood, and believed a St. Bernard had bitten him; he did not actually see the dog bite him and conceded he was in the middle of the sidewalk and not close to the fence.
The Enriquezes disputed that Beethoven bit Johnson, testifying Beethoven was meek, had not bitten before, and could not fit his head through the fence gaps; they admitted Beethoven had sometimes stuck his snout through and the screening might not have been secured the day of the incident.
Johnson asserted negligence per se based on a municipal ordinance requiring animals be kept exclusively on the owner’s premises by physical restraint; the trial court refused to direct a verdict for Johnson but instructed the jury with the Ordinance’s language and submitted proximate cause; the jury answered that Enriquez’s negligence did not proximately cause the occurrence, and the court entered a take-nothing judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Enriquez was negligent per se (legal sufficiency)	Johnson argued Enriquez violated the city "Restraint" ordinance by failing to keep the dog exclusively on his premises by physical restraint, so negligence per se is established as a matter of law.	Enriquez contended the evidence did not show a violation causing the injury because there was no conclusive proof Beethoven bit Johnson or that the dog could reach him from the fence.	Court affirmed: evidence legally sufficient to support jury's verdict for defendant; plaintiff did not prove proximate cause as a matter of law.
Whether the jury's no-negligence finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence (factual sufficiency)	Johnson argued the verdict was manifestly unjust given testimony about screening, prior snout protrusion, and Enriquez’s awareness of risk.	Enriquez argued credibility conflicts, lack of direct evidence the dog bit Johnson, and uncontradicted testimony the dog could not reach the middle of the sidewalk; jury could reasonably disbelieve Johnson.	Court affirmed: factual sufficiency challenge failed — the jury’s verdict was not so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong.

Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Texas 2001) (standard for no-evidence and conclusive-evidence legal-sufficiency review)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (jury credibility and evidentiary-review principles in civil cases)
Zavala v. Trujillo, 883 S.W.2d 242 (El Paso App. 1994) (negligence per se is a method of proving breach, not a separate cause of action)
Carter v. William Sommerville and Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1979) (negligence per se adopts statutory standard as reasonable-person conduct)
Trujillo v. Carrasco, 318 S.W.3d 455 (El Paso App. 2010) (elements for negligence per se and discussion of proximate cause in dog-bite context)
Bushnell v. Mott, 254 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. 2008) (owner liability for negligent handling of a dog)