Bobby Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 895 F.3d 1166

Bobby Dutta applied to State Farm’s Agency Career Track (ACT) program; applicants must authorize a consumer credit report, and certain credit events within a 24‑month lookback (e.g., charged‑off account > $1,000) disqualify applicants.
State Farm obtained Dutta’s credit report, determined he was ineligible, and communicated disqualification by email on March 18, 2014; Dutta received the statutory pre‑adverse action notice (with the report) dated March 11, 2014 three days after the alleged adverse action.
Dutta alleged the credit report contained inaccuracies (e.g., charged‑off debt date, loan delinquency dates) and that State Farm denied him the opportunity required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) to review and dispute the report before the adverse decision.
Dutta sued under FCRA for willful failure to provide the required notice and report; State Farm moved for summary judgment and attached the Beasley Declaration to its reply explaining that the charged‑off item within 24 months alone disqualified him.
Dutta did not object or seek leave to file a sur‑reply in district court to the new declaration; the district court found Dutta lacked Article III standing (no concrete injury) and granted summary judgment for State Farm. Dutta appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court improperly relied on evidence (Beasley Declaration) submitted with State Farm’s reply	Dutta argued the declaration was new factual matter in a reply and he was denied opportunity to respond	State Farm argued local rules permit reply declarations and Dutta waived objection by not seeking relief below	Court held Dutta waived any challenge by failing to object in district court; consideration was proper
Whether Dutta has Article III standing to sue for an FCRA § 1681b(b)(3)(A) violation	Dutta argued State Farm violated FCRA by providing the statutory notice after taking adverse action and by denying a meaningful opportunity to dispute inaccuracies, causing harm to employment prospects	State Farm argued any procedural violation caused no concrete harm because the charged‑off account—accurately reported—was dispositive under the ACT criteria, so Dutta suffered only a bare procedural violation	Court held Dutta lacked standing: although statute protects a concrete interest, here the procedural violation did not cause actual harm or a material risk of harm because the charged‑off item alone disqualified him

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (explains FCRA’s purpose to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (clarifies that Article III requires a concrete injury beyond a bare procedural statutory violation)
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.) (Spokeo II: two‑step test for whether procedural statutory violations protect concrete interests and present material risk of harm)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing elements and injury‑in‑fact requirements)
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (procedural‑rights‑in‑vacuo doctrine; procedural deprivation without concrete interest insufficient for standing)
Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478 (reply evidence at summary judgment; district courts should allow non‑movant an opportunity to respond)
Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852 (failure to object below waives challenge to admissibility of evidence submitted in reply)
Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776 (no standing where procedural FCRA violation posed no material risk of harm)
Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762 (procedural FCRA violation can support standing only where plaintiff plausibly ties real harm to the violation)
Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329 (FCRA protects against transmission of inaccurate credit information)
Bergt v. Ret. Plan for Pilots Employed by MarkAir, Inc., 293 F.3d 1139 (standard of review for summary judgment)