Bob Rhodes v. Raytheon Company
663 F. App'x 541
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Rhodes appealed denial of relief and later sought reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on a sworn EEOC declaration obtained during his first appeal (Rhodes I).
- He attempted to supplement the appellate record with the declaration but the Ninth Circuit denied that request during the appeal.
- Rhodes waited approximately six months after the mandate issued in Rhodes I to file his Rule 60(b)(6) motion; overall more than two years elapsed from when he first obtained the declaration to when he filed the motion.
- The district court denied the 60(b)(6) motion as untimely and on the merits, concluding the declaration did not amount to the extraordinary circumstances needed for 60(b)(6) relief.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed, finding Rhodes provided no adequate explanation for the post-mandate delay and that the declaration did not conclusively rebut the Payan mailing presumption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Rhodes: the EEOC declaration is newly obtained evidence showing the original decision was erroneous | Respondents: the motion was untimely and the declaration is not extraordinary or dispositive | No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed |
| Whether Rhodes filed within a "reasonable time" under Rule 60(c) | Rhodes: EEOC handling in 2010 explains timing | Respondents: Rhodes gave no adequate reason for waiting six months after the mandate | Rhodes offered no explanation for the post-mandate delay; court upheld denial as untimely on record |
| Whether the EEOC declaration rebuts the Payan presumption that notice was mailed on date of issue | Rhodes: declaration undermines factual basis of earlier ruling | Respondents: declaration is suggestive but does not conclusively rebut mailing presumption | Declaration did not dispositively rebut the Payan presumption; not sufficient for 60(b)(6) relief |
| Whether Rhodes should have sought relief under a different Rule 60(b) ground | Rhodes implied alternative grounds might apply | Respondents: district court need not address alternate theories where 60(b)(6) fails | Court declined to decide appropriateness of other 60(b) grounds; denial of 60(b)(6) dispositive and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review for Rule 60 motions and reconsideration principles)
- Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary remedy used sparingly)
- Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (scope of Rule 60(b)(6) relief)
- Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2009) (reconsideration appropriate only for new evidence, clear error, or intervening law)
- Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1981) (factors for determining what constitutes a "reasonable time" under Rule 60)
- Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (mailing presumption for EEOC notices)