Bob Greene, as Next Friend of Lewayne Greene v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 446 S.W.3d 761

LaWayne Greene insured a dwelling in Irving under Farmers HOA form; the policy suspended dwelling coverage after 60 days of vacancy unless extended-vacancy endorsement (TDP-011) was purchased.
Greene moved to a retirement community and notified Farmers of her sale plans, giving a change of address.
Nov. 14, 2007, fire damaged Greene’s vacant home; Farmers denied the claim on the basis of vacancy over 60 days.
Greene sued for breach of contract and extra-contractual damages; trial court granted Greene’s breach claim; court of appeals reversed and held vacancy gap applied only by its terms and not requiring causation.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding §862.054 did not apply and the vacancy provision is not a breach under that statute; it is a coverage scope issue governed by policy language and TDI form endorsements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tex. Ins. Code § 862.054 precludes the vacancy clause as a defense	Greene—statute precludes a technicality defense	Farmers—statute does not apply to this policy issue	§862.054 does not apply; vacancy clause not a breach under the statute
Whether the vacancy clause requires prejudice/causation analysis to deny coverage	Greene—vacancy did not cause loss; no prejudice to insurer	Farmers—clause governs coverage scope regardless of causation	Prejudice analysis not controlling; clause defines scope of coverage, not a traditional breach
Whether public policy bars enforcing the vacancy clause	Greene—anti-technicality policy and Puckett protect coverage	Public policy favors adherence to form and TDI endorsements	Public policy does not preclude enforcement; TDI HO-A form and TDP-011 endorsement support enforcement
Whether the material-breach framework applies to this case	Greene—Hernandez/PAJ/Prodigy/Lennar require prejudice inquiry for immaterial breaches	Court may apply material-breach framework to determine coverage	Court declines material-breach rationale; case is coverage-defining, not breach-based
Whether the decision should be limited to this policy or extend to similar provisions	Greene—apply Hernandez lineage to similar terms	Extend public-policy/public-regulatory approach only to narrow provisions	Conclude policy terms governing coverage, not extend Hernandez beyond its scope

Lennar Corp. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 413 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. 2013) (material breach means loss of anticipated insurer benefits; prejudice required)
Prodigy Commc’ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2009) (immaterial notice breach not depriving insurer of bargain; prejudice required)
PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 243 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2008) (notice/advertising injury provisions; prejudice analysis for coverage)
Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994) (settlement-without-consent; prejudice-based approach to coverage)
Kline v. Guar. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 845 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1992) (breach/coverage distinction in insurance)
Cutaia v. Fort Worth Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1972) (judicial deference to statutes/board-approved forms in insurance)
Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984) (public policy for anti-technicality in aviation insurance)