Bob Fannon, Individually and as a City Councilman for the City of LaFollette v. City of LaFollotte, 329 S.W.3d 418

Fannon, a LaFollette City Council member, filed a declaratory judgment alleging Open Meetings Act violations by Hatmaker, Stanfield, Snodderly, and the City related to pay raises and vacancies.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order restricting pay raises until Charter requirements were met; the Open Meetings Act issues were not resolved at that stage.
At a June 28, 2007 meeting, the Council approved the pay raises; the Plaintiff dissented and the trial court later noted Charter violations but did not resolve the Open Meetings Act claim.
The trial court later held the Open Meetings Act issue moot after the August 7, 2007 meeting but awarded the Plaintiff no attorney’s fees and limited discretionary costs.
The Court of Appeals held Plaintiff lacked official-capacity standing but had Open Meetings Act standing as a citizen; it reversed the fee award and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The Supreme Court held Plaintiff lacked official-capacity standing but had Open Meetings Act standing; he was a prevailing party entitled to discretionary costs but not attorney’s fees, and the matter was remanded for costs remaining consistent with the ruling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing—official capacity	Fannon had official-capacity standing as a council member	Plaintiff lacked authority to sue in official capacity	Plaintiff had no official-capacity standing
Open Meetings Act standing	Any citizen may challenge Open Meetings Act violations	Standing requires more than a mere public-right interest	Plaintiff had standing under the Open Meetings Act as a citizen
Taxpayer standing and prior demand	Taxpayer standing due to alleged misuse of funds; prior demand unnecessary	Taxpayer must show prior demand or futile action	Taxpayer standing not established; demand requirement not satisfied under these facts
Prevailing party status	Plaintiff prevailed by securing relief and injunctive effects	Temporary relief alone does not confer prevailing party status	Plaintiff was a prevailing party for purposes of discretionary costs but not attorney’s fees
Attorney’s fees and American Rule	Dobson exception should allow attorney’s fees due to public-interest action	American Rule governs; no fee-shifting statute or Dobson exception applies	No attorney’s fees; discretionary costs allowed; remand for quantified costs

Darnell v. American Civil Liberties Union of Tenn., 195 S.W.3d 612 (Tenn. 2006) (standing elements; public-rights open to suit)
Metropolitan Air Research Testing Authority v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 842 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992) (Sunshine Law standing; broad citizen standing)
Zseltvay v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 986 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) (Sunshine Law standing for citizen plaintiff)
Abel v. Welch, 204 Tenn. 6, 315 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1958) (no standing for purchasing/financing commission members lacking separate legal existence)
Badgett v. Rogers, 436 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. 1968) (prior-demand exceptions for taxpayer standing if remedy sought is unlawful use of funds)
Cobb v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 771 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1989) (taxpayer standing when alleging illegal expenditure; requires prior notice/demand)
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (prevailing party requires meaningful relief; not just a TRO unless merits resolved)
Daron v. Department of Correction, 44 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. 2001) (analogy to prevailing party standards for public employees)
Darnell; MARTA; Malone (contextual references), (various) (various) (standing and public-law relief principles cited in analysis)