752 S.E.2d 837
Va.2014Background
- Developers and Williamsburg Landing entered rezoning proffers requiring per-dwelling cash payments, payable before final inspection and issuance of certificates of occupancy under their proffers.
- The General Assembly enacted Va. Code § 15.2-2303.1:1(A), effective July 1, 2010, providing that cash proffers "shall be collected or accepted by any locality only after completion of the final inspection and prior to the time of the issuance of any certificate of occupancy."
- The Attorney General opined that the statute applies to proffers formed before July 1, 2010 except to the extent it would impair contracts or vested rights.
- James City County continued accepting some proffer payments before final inspections after June 30, 2010; developers challenged that practice and sought refunds and fees.
- County filed declaratory judgment action seeking prospective application only; circuit court granted summary judgment to developers, held § 15.2-2303.1:1(A) governs payments owed on or after July 1, 2010 regardless of when proffers were made, and awarded attorneys’ fees to developers (but also to Williamsburg Landing).
- On appeal, Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed retroactive application to timing of collection, reversed fee award to Williamsburg Landing, and affirmed fee award to developers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (County) | Defendant's Argument (Developers/Williamsburg Landing) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 15.2-2303.1:1(A) applies to proffers agreed before July 1, 2010 | Statute is not clearly retroactive; presumption against retroactivity and Code § 1-239/Constitution bar impairment of vested rights | "Notwithstanding" language shows legislative intent to control timing of collection for any proffer still owing after June 30, 2010 | Court: statute governs timing of collection for payments due on/after July 1, 2010, even if proffers predated statute (subject to not impairing vested contractual rights) |
| Whether § 15.2-2303.1:1(A) conflicts with Code § 15.2-2303.3 | Conflict would render § 15.2-2303.3 meaningless | No conflict: § 15.2-2303.1:1(A) limits when a locality may accept/collect payments; applicants may still offer other terms | Court: no conflict; statutes harmonized—§15.2-2303.1:1(A) limits timing of collection while §15.2-2303.3 remains effective for other enforcement contexts |
| Whether developers/Williamsburg Landing "successfully challenged an administrative or other action" to justify attorneys’ fees under § 15.2-2303.1:1(C) | Fees unavailable in declaratory actions; County says its acceptance of voluntary payments was not an "action" in conflict with statute | Developers: counterclaim directly challenged County’s acceptance of payments in violation of the statute; thus they prevailed on that action | Court: Williamsburg Landing did not challenge any County action and was not entitled to fees; developers did challenge County’s acceptance and were entitled to fees under §15.2-2303.1:1(C) |
| Whether voluntary payments accepted by County constitute an "acceptance" or actionable conduct under the statute | County: voluntary payments do not equal an actionable administrative "acceptance" | Developers: statutory text covers both "collected or accepted" payments, so voluntary payments fall within the statute | Court: statutory language unambiguously covers both collected and accepted payments; developers prevailed on that claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Sussex Community Servs. Ass'n v. Virginia Soc'y for Mentally Retarded Children, 251 Va. 240 (1996) (statutory language can indicate retroactive application when context shows intent)
- Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408 (2003) (presumption that statutes operate prospectively; retroactivity not favored)
- Mozley v. Prestwould Bd. of Directors, 264 Va. 549 (2002) (statutory authorization can permit fee awards in declaratory judgment actions when statute implicated)
- City of Portsmouth v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 141 Va. 44 (1925) (state may modify or withdraw authority conferred on localities)