Board of Supervisors v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C.
151 So. 3d 908
La. Ct. App.2014Background
- LSU expropriated Mid City Holdings’ property via quick-taking under La. R.S. 19:141-60, transferring title upon deposit of estimated value.
- Notice of expropriation was served March 28, 2011; funds were deposited, and Mid City Holdings joined in a consent judgment distributing encumbrance payments on May 9, 2011.
- Mid City filed an answer and reconventional demand after the 30‑day window, but within an informal extension through April 28, 2011; the pleadings were untimely for additional compensation.
- LSU filed peremptory exceptions of prescription and peremption on February 10, 2014; the trial court sustained prescription, dismissing the claims for additional compensation.
- The issue presented is whether the 30‑day period under La. R.S. 19:150(1) (read with La. R.S. 19:152) operates as a prescriptive period for a claim for additional compensation in a quick-taking expropriation, or whether a three-year period applies; the court converts the appeal to supervisory review, affirms the prescription ruling, and dismisses with prejudice the additional-compensation claims.
- The court amends the judgment to supply decretal language and renders judgment in favor of LSU, dismissing Mid City’s additional-compensation claims with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the 30-day period to file an answer under 19:150(1) prescriptive for additional compensation in quick-taking expropriation? | Mid City Holdings contends the period is substantive prescriptive time. | LSU relies on 19:150(1) read with 19:152 to treat the period as prescriptive. | Yes; the 30-day period functions as a prescriptive period for claims for additional compensation. |
| Is the three-year prescriptive period of 13:5111 A applicable here? | Mid City argues 13:5111 A governs compensation claims. | LSU argues 13:5111 A does not apply to expropriations. | No; 13:5111 A does not apply to expropriation proceedings and the 30-day period governs. |
| Was there decretal language in the judgment sufficient for appellate review? | Mid City asserts the judgment lacked final decretal language. | LSU argues appellate jurisdiction may be exercised via supervisory review. | The court converted to supervisory review, amended the judgment to include decretal language, and affirmed the ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. and Agric. and Meek Coll. v. 2330 Palmyra St., L.L.C., 80 So.3d 1234 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2011) (addressed timely filing inside 30 days for quick-taking disputes)
- Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 52 So.3d 909 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2010) (final judgment must be definite and decretal for appellate review)
- State Through Dept. of Highways v. Higgins, 135 So.2d 306 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (early view that timely answer within 30 days governs compensation claims)
- Jackson Brewing Co. v. State Through Dept. of Highways, 146 So.2d 504 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (mandatory 30-day answer; no exception absent statutory language)
- West Jefferson Levee Dist. v. Coast Quality Constr. Corp., 640 So.2d 1258 (La. 1994) (expropriation procedure and timelines inform prescriptive posture)
- Wynat Development Co. v. Board of Levee Comm’rs for Parish of Orleans, 710 So.2d 783 (La. 1998) (distinguishes appropriation from expropriation for prescriptive purposes)