Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Illinois State Board of Education
2017 IL App (1st) 161147
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Frankie Hall, a tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher, was placed on a remediation plan in 2012 and filed a grievance seeking arbitration; the Board rejected arbitration and later filed dismissal charges in July 2013 for failure to complete remediation.
- Parties selected an ISBE-approved hearing officer; the dismissal hearing was scheduled for January 6, 2014, then rescheduled three times by agreement (care for ill relative; settlement negotiations).
- Hall later moved (July 28, 2014) to stay the dismissal hearing pending resolution of her 2012 grievance/arbitration, asserting the grievance might obviate dismissal; the hearing officer granted the stay, citing judicial economy and absence of prejudice.
- The Board filed a declaratory-judgment action in Cook County seeking a declaration that the hearing officer’s stay was void because the School Code permits extensions only for mutual agreement or "good cause," which the Board argued did not exist here.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board and denied Hall’s motion; on appeal the First District affirmed, holding the School Code’s definition of "good cause" (illness or otherwise unavoidable emergency of listed persons) did not cover Hall’s pending, long-standing grievance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the hearing officer had authority to stay the dismissal hearing absent statutory "good cause" or mutual agreement | The stay was void because the School Code allows extensions only for mutual agreement or "good cause," and neither statutory category applied here | Hearing officer had discretion under ISBE rules to find good cause based on pending grievance and related arbitration uncertainty; Board waived objection by previously agreeing to schedule outside statutory windows | Court: Statute unambiguously limits "good cause" to illness or "unavoidable emergency" of specified persons; a long-pending grievance is not an "unavoidable emergency," so stay was unauthorized and Board entitled to judgment as a matter of law |
| Whether the Board waived its right to timely hearing by agreeing to prior reschedulings | Board’s discrete, narrow agreements to reschedule (emails) did not constitute wholesale waiver of future objections to extensions | Hall argued the Board’s prior agreements amounted to waiver of its right to an expedited hearing | Court: Prior discrete agreements do not show intent to waive all future objections or mislead; no waiver as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 346 Ill. App. 3d 18 (appellate court) (standard of review for declaratory relief)
- Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643 (Ill.) (summary judgment standard)
- Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2015 IL 117443 (Ill.) (agencies may act only as authorized by statute)
- Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 IL 113907 (Ill.) (use of dictionary to define undefined statutory term)
- Northwest Diversified, Inc. v. Desai, 353 Ill. App. 3d 378 (appellate court) (waiver requires conduct that reasonably misleads the other party)