420 P.3d 161
Wyo.2018Background
- In 1913 two "Right of Way Deeds" conveyed strips of land from Box Creek's predecessors to Big Horn Railway (BNSF's predecessor); deeds recorded in Converse County, WY.
- Deeds use mixed language: titled "Right of Way Deed," granting clauses use "grant, bargain, sell and convey" and habendum clauses state "to have and to hold... forever," while also referencing "right of way," "over and across," station grounds, irrigation crossings, and a limited snow-fence right.
- Box Creek sued BNSF seeking declaratory judgment and to quiet title to underlying mineral rights, arguing the deeds conveyed only an easement/right-of-way and not the mineral estate.
- District court denied summary judgment, held a bench trial, admitted Box Creek’s expert (Marc Strahn), and found the deeds ambiguous and intended as an easement-like conveyance; title to minerals was quieted in Box Creek.
- BNSF appealed, challenging (1) whether the deeds conveyed the mineral estate and (2) the district court’s admission of Strahn’s expert testimony under Daubert/Bunting.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1913 right-of-way deeds conveyed the underlying mineral estates | Deeds are ambiguous and, read in full and in historical context, show intent to convey only a right of way/easement; minerals not conveyed | Granting and habendum language convey fee simple (real estate) so minerals pass to railroad | Deeds are ambiguous; historical meaning of "right of way" (1913) and deed terms indicate a limited grant (easement); minerals retained by Box Creek (affirmed) |
| Whether district court properly admitted expert testimony of Marc Strahn | Strahn qualified as a landman; his review of deeds and historical conveyancing practices is helpful to show intent | Strahn’s methodology lacked empirical foundation and was unreliable under Daubert/Bunting; testimony should be excluded | Trial court failed to make specific gatekeeping findings as to reliability (error), but admission was harmless because the court’s deed-based, historical-context analysis alone supports the judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Tr., 126 P.3d 909 (Wyo. 2006) (standard of review and intent interpretation principles for deeds)
- Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Tr., 106 P.3d 858 (Wyo. 2005) (presumption that mineral estate passes when surface conveyed without reservation)
- Thornock v. Esterholdt, 299 P.3d 68 (Wyo. 2013) (definition and limits of easements and rights of way)
- Caballo Coal Co. v. Fid. Expl. & Prod. Co., 84 P.3d 311 (Wyo. 2004) (focus on parties' intent and historical context in mineral-deed interpretation)
- Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999) (Daubert gatekeeping and expert admissibility guidance)
- Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2000) (trial-court discretion in conducting Daubert analysis)
- Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (U.S. 1942) (right-of-way grants under federal statute convey an easement, not fee)