BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe, 7:20-cv-01357

Background

BMG Monroe I, LLC (developer) owns a 78.93-acre tract containing the conditionally approved Smith Farm Project (181 homes; 44 in the Village) that underwent a SEQRA review with the Village as lead agency.
SEQRA Findings, the 2006 Findings Statement, conditional preliminary approval, and the 2015 Amended Findings/Final Approval conditioned project approval on specific site layout and architectural features (e.g., rear elevation, roof pitch, siding).
After BMG succeeded to the application, the Village Building Inspector denied five building-permit applications in 2017–2018, citing noncompliance with the SEQRA/approval conditions; BMG appealed (for Lots 45 & 46) to the ZBA, which upheld the denials.
BMG challenged the ZBA decision in state court (Article 78) and lost; it then sued the Village in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process, equal protection) and the Fair Housing Act, alleging religious discrimination against the Hasidic Jewish community and challenging several local laws.
The Village moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (ripeness, standing) and failure to state a claim; the District Court dismissed BMG’s Complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (primarily ripeness and lack of third‑party standing).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Third‑party standing to assert rights of Hasidic community	BMG claims Village acted to exclude Hasidic Jews and presses §1983/FHA claims tied to that discrimination	Village argues BMG cannot vindicate rights of unnamed third parties and lacks allegations showing close relation or that third parties are hindered from suing	Court: BMG lacks third‑party standing; it failed to identify injured third parties, show close relation, or show hindrance; may not assert rights of Hasidic community
Standing re: challenge to local laws (No‑Knock, Accessory Apt., FAR)	BMG contends these laws are discriminatory and injure project/housing availability	Village shows the Accessory Apartment law applies to existing homeowners (not developer), FAR law exempted previously approved subdivisions, and No‑Knock injures brokers/investors, not BMG	Court: BMG lacks injury‑in‑fact to rest claims on those laws and cannot assert them on behalf of third parties
Ripeness of claims based on building‑permit denials (final decision requirement)	BMG contends denials inflicted concrete injury and litigation is ripe; argues seeking variances would be futile	Village contends no final decision because BMG did not exhaust local remedies (no appeal for Lots 1–3; no variance sought for Lots 45–46)	Court: Claims unripe under Williamson doctrine; final decision/variance required before federal review; dismissal without prejudice
Futility exception to ripeness (was variance pursuit futile?)	BMG argues further appeals/variance requests would be futile given alleged entrenched hostility	Village says no showing that board lacks discretion or will always deny relief	Court: Futility exception not met; allegations of hostility insufficient; BMG did not plead lack of discretion or clear-cut policy of denial

Key Cases Cited

Lucas v. Planning Bd. of Town of LaGrange, 7 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining SEQRA review process)
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (final‑decision requirement for land‑use takings/ripeness)
Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (variance exhaustion and narrow futility exception)
In re Clinton Nurseries, Inc., 998 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2021) (standing implicates subject‑matter jurisdiction; courts may raise sua sponte)
Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (U.S. 1984) (limits on third‑party standing)
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1976) (third‑party standing test and rationale)
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1991) (elements for third‑party standing)
Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (ripeness and extension of Williamson to equal protection/due process land‑use claims)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard post‑Twombly)
Fenstermaker v. Obama, [citation="354 F. App'x 452"] (2d Cir. 2009) (no standing based on hypothetical future clients)
Lost Trail LLC v. Town of Weston, [citation="289 F. App'x 443"] (2d Cir. 2008) (futility exception requires showing lack of discretion or clear refusal)