Bly v. Com., 702 S.E.2d 120

Bly was convicted at bench trial of possession with intent to distribute an imitation substance and of methamphetamine, following drug buys by a confidential informant, Hoyle.
Hoyle was thoroughly searched, given marked money, and observed entering 1805 Walnut Avenue where Bly allegedly sold drugs; Hoyle produced a bag that later tested negative for controlled substances for the May offense and a meth-containing bag for the June offense.
Hoyle testified to purchases, but there was no visual/audio recording of the transactions and no corroborating physical evidence tying Bly to the sales.
Before Bly's trial, the Commonwealth learned Hoyle had provided misleading accounts on other cases and was paid per purchase; a later Commonwealth letter disclosed potential fabrication and misidentification issues.
Bly filed a motion for a new trial in 2006 arguing the non-disclosed exculpatory/impeachment material, in the Commonwealth’s possession before trial, violated Brady v. Maryland and tainted the trial.
The circuit court denied the new-trial motion in 2007; Bly appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, prompting Bly to obtain Supreme Court review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Brady material was prejudicial to Bly	Bly argues the undisclosed material was exculpatory and prejudicial.	Commonwealth asserts no prejudice since other evidence supported conviction.	Yes; suppression prejudiced Bly and required reversal.
Whether non-disclosed evidence could have been used for impeachment	Non-disclosed impeachment material could undermine the entire investigation.	Non-disclosed evidence would not affect admissibility or outcome.	Yes; it could have led to impeachment and undermined confidence in the verdict.

Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 633 (2006) (Douglas Brady materiality and impeachment impact on trial fairness)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality and collective consideration of suppressed evidence)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality and prejudice standard for suppressed evidence)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (duty to disclose favorable evidence extends beyond prosecutors)