373 F. Supp. 3d 191
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiffs are ~201 Members of Congress who allege President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause by accepting benefits (hotel payments, licensing fees, IP rights, real-estate receipts, regulatory favors) from foreign states without Congress's consent.
- The President moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, urging a narrow definition of "Emolument" limited to compensation for services rendered in an official or employment-like capacity.
- The Court previously held plaintiffs had Article III standing (Blumenthal I) and here resolves remaining 12(b)(6) and equitable-relief issues deferred earlier.
- The parties and amici disputed the ordinary meaning of "Emolument," historical usage, Clause purpose, and Executive Branch practice; amici historians and former ethics officers supported a broad meaning (profit, gain, advantage).
- The Court evaluated founding-era dictionaries, constitutional text and structure, historical practice, OLC/Comptroller General opinions, and precedent to interpret "Emolument," and considered whether plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief against the President.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "Emolument" under the Foreign Emoluments Clause | Broad: any profit, gain, or advantage (including commercial receipts tied to President's businesses) | Narrow: limited to compensation for services rendered in an official or employment-like capacity | Court: "Emolument" is broad—any profit, gain, or advantage (adopting plaintiffs' reading) |
| Whether the Amended Complaint states a claim | Allegations that the President accepted various foreign benefits plausibly state Clause violations under the broad definition | Even accepting facts, the term doesn't reach private commercial receipts; no actionable claim | Court: Plaintiffs stated a plausible claim; complaint survives 12(b)(6) |
| Whether plaintiffs (Members of Congress) have a cause of action to seek injunctive relief | Members have an interest in withholding consent and may seek equitable relief to enforce the Clause; implied remedial relief is available for constitutional violations | No implied private cause of action; relief belongs to Congress; suits directly against the President should be barred or subject to extreme restraint | Court: Plaintiffs have an implied cause of action and satisfy the zone-of-interests; equitable relief is appropriate here |
| Constitutionality of injunction against the President | Injunction to require compliance with Clause is ministerial (no discretion) and therefore permissible in appropriate cases | Injunctive relief against the President would unduly interfere with executive/political duties and should be barred or cabined | Court: Relief sought is constitutional because the Clause imposes a ministerial duty (no discretion) and injunction would not impermissibly interfere |
Key Cases Cited
- NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014) (practice and historical sources inform constitutional interpretation)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (use of ordinary public meaning and founding-era sources in constitutional interpretation)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not accepted on motion to dismiss; plausibility standard)
- Trump v. District of Columbia (District of Maryland), 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (2018) (earlier district-court interpretation supporting broad Emoluments Clause meaning)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (limitations on implied causes of action; equitable relief against federal officials context)
- Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (scope of judicial jurisdiction over the President and separation-of-powers considerations)
- Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (ordinary time spent defending suits may be part of President's official duties; suits against President may proceed in some circumstances)
- Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing ministerial duties from discretionary ones for purposes of injunctive relief)
- Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) (context may enlarge or restrain meaning of terms in constitutional text)