818 S.E.2d 239
S.C. Ct. App.2018Background
- Owners of front-row Sullivan's Island residences sought a permit (2010) to trim vegetation on Town-owned ocean-adjacent lots that have accreted since 1991; they wanted vegetation reduced to three feet as reflected in a 1981 Town ordinance.
- In 1991 the Lowcountry Open Land Trust conveyed the accreted land to the Town subject to deed restrictions preserving the property "in its natural state" as of the grant, but giving Town council authority to trim vegetation for mosquito control, scenic enhancement, access, and views; the deed allowed the Town to enact more restrictive regulations.
- Town ordinances evolved: 1981 ordinance allowed trimming to 3 feet; 1995 ordinance raised the minimum height to 7 feet; 2005 ordinance specified permissible species and set a 5-foot minimum. Over time vegetation developed into a maritime forest.
- Appellants sued after the Town denied the trimming permit, asserting breach of contract, breach of contract with fraudulent act, nuisance, SCUTPA, inverse condemnation, and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages.
- The master granted summary judgment to the Town on multiple grounds (contract claims, nuisance, mandamus, inverse condemnation), concluding the deed did not require the Town to maintain 1991 vegetation levels and the Town ordinances were permissible under the deed; the circuit court affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deed requires Town to preserve vegetation exactly as in 1991 (trim to 3') | Deed’s reference to "condition of the Property at the time of this grant" requires restoring/maintaining 1991 vegetation and views (3' trimming) | Deed permits Town authority to trim for listed purposes and allows Town to adopt more restrictive ordinances; deed does not compel 3' trimming | Court: Deed unambiguous; read as whole, allows Town ordinances that permit less trimming; no contractual breach |
| Whether nuisance claim can proceed against Town for overgrowth | Overgrowth created public/private nuisance (pests, fire hazard, cover for crime) requiring abatement | Town: law authorizes its ordinances; statutory immunity for governmental nuisance liability; claim effectively contractual | Court: Plaintiff’s theory sounds in contract; because no breach, nuisance claim fails; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act claim survives (Tort Claims Act immunity) | Fraud claim asserted alongside breach to avoid immunity | Town: Tort Claims Act shields governmental legislative action/inaction and certain employee conduct | Court: Did not reach immunity ground because primary contract claim fails; master had earlier found immunity applicable |
| Whether plaintiffs proved damages without SCDHEC permit/compliance | Plaintiffs: Town denial caused property-value loss; damages alleged | Town: Plaintiffs failed to obtain required SCDHEC permit to cut, so cannot prove damages from denial | Court: Declined to reach these alternative grounds because disposition rests on contract interpretation; prior master relied on lack of SCDHEC permit but appellate court affirmed on contract grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Penza v. Pendleton Station, 404 S.C. 198 (summary judgment standard)
- Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 331 S.C. 398 (deed interpretation is equitable)
- Hunt v. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564 (construction of clear deed is question of law)
- Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561 (ambiguity standard for deed language)
- Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 578 (construe deed as whole to effect grantor intent)
- Williams v. Teran, Inc., 266 S.C. 55 (court’s goal to give effect to parties’ intent)
- Ravan v. Greenville Cty., 315 S.C. 447 (definition and unreasonableness requirement for nuisance)
- Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277 (nuisance principles)
- Home Sales, Inc. v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 299 S.C. 70 (lawful acts cannot be nuisance)
- Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598 (appellate courts need not reach alternative issues when earlier disposition is dispositive)