925 F.3d 541
1st Cir.2019Background
- At a destination wedding at the Horned Dorset Primavera Hotel (Puerto Rico) guests began deliberately wetting and soaping a temporary dancefloor and "slip-and-slide" activity ensued; the groom and other guests participated despite hotel staff warnings to the groom.
- Hotel employee Thouvenin warned the groom but did not warn all guests or deploy security or other measures; the temporary dancefloor had been rented from a vendor.
- Kristin Blomquist slipped and fell on the soapy, wet dancefloor after changing into a bathing suit, fracturing her wrist and injuring her back.
- Blomquist and her husband sued the hotel and its insurer under Puerto Rico tort law (Article 1802) for negligence; a jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
- Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50(b)) or, alternatively, a new trial; the district court denied both motions. Plaintiffs appealed and the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether hotel breached its heightened duty of care by allowing/ not remedying a known dangerous condition (wet, soapy dancefloor) | Hotel knew of the condition and should have warned all guests and taken steps to stop the dangerous activity | Hotel warned the groom, staff acted reasonably under the circumstances, and additional interventions could have been ineffective or counterproductive | Jury reasonably could find breach limited to inadequate warning to the groom rather than broader remedial failure; issue for the jury affirmed |
| Whether hotel's breach proximately caused Blomquist's injuries | Failure to warn/allay the dangerous condition directly caused the fall and injuries | Blomquist knowingly joined the slip-and-slide; her deliberate conduct was the proximate (legal) cause that superseded any omission by hotel | Sufficient evidence supported jury finding that Blomquist's deliberate conduct, not hotel's omission, was proximate cause; affirm |
| Whether district court should have granted JMOL (Rule 50) | Evidence compelled judgment for plaintiffs because hotel had knowledge and a heightened duty | Standard of review defers to jury; reasonable jury could credit hotel's evidence (video, eyewitness) | Denial of JMOL reviewed de novo but verdict stands because evidence could lead reasonable jury to verdict for defendants |
| Whether district court abused discretion denying new trial based on witness credibility/inconsistencies | Eyewitness Rosa's testimony conflicted with photo/stipulation and Blomquist's testimony; verdict against weight of evidence | Credibility determinations are for the jury; conflicting testimony alone is insufficient for new trial | Denial of new trial not an abuse of discretion; jury credibility choice affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson's, Inc., 915 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2019) (standard of review for Rule 50(b) JMOL)
- Sailor Inc. F/V v. City of Rockland, 428 F.3d 348 (1st Cir. 2005) (deferential scrutiny of jury verdict)
- Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 2007) (construing facts in favor of jury when reviewing JMOL)
- Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430 (1st Cir. 2009) (standard for new trial review and deference to jury credibility)
- Lama v. Borrás, 16 F.3d 473 (1st Cir. 1994) (JMOL standard: only if reasonable jury could reach one conclusion)
- Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 1997) (hotels' heightened duty of care to guests)
- Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (duty and breach analysis under Puerto Rico law)
- Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (standards relating to new trial review and appellate deference)
- Correia v. Feeney, 620 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2010) (deference to trial court's assessment of weight of evidence)
- United States v. García, 978 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1992) (conflicting testimony generally does not warrant new trial)