BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204

Background

Plaintiffs are victims and families of victims of terrorist attacks by Hamas (2001–2003), alleging BLOM Bank aided and abetted Hamas by providing financial services to its affiliates.
BLOM Bank argued that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim under the Anti-Terrorism Act (as amended by JASTA), particularly regarding the 'general awareness' element for aiding-and-abetting liability.
Plaintiffs repeatedly declined opportunities to amend their complaint during district court proceedings, choosing to stand on their original allegations.
The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for insufficient pleading and denied leave to amend, given plaintiffs' refusals and failure to identify additional facts.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal but used a less stringent standard for 'general awareness.' Plaintiffs then sought, under Rule 60(b)(6), to reopen the judgment to amend their complaint per the clarified standard; this was denied by the District Court but reversed by the Second Circuit, prompting Supreme Court review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s 'extraordinary circumstances' standard applies when seeking to reopen judgment to amend a complaint	Plaintiffs argued that the Second Circuit's clarification of the law justified reopening to amend under a more liberal Rule 15(a) standard	BLOM argued that plaintiffs must meet the strict Rule 60(b)(6) standard before any amendment; plaintiffs' litigation choices counseled against relief	Rule 60(b)(6)’s 'extraordinary circumstances' standard applies and does not become less demanding when reopening to amend complaint
Whether courts should balance Rule 60(b) finality and Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy when considering Rule 60(b)(6) motions	Plaintiffs supported balancing both rules to allow amendments when justice demands	BLOM contended Rule 60(b)(6) must stand alone and cannot be diluted by Rule 15 standards	Courts must apply Rule 60(b)(6) on its own; Rule 15(a)'s policy cannot dilute Rule 60(b)(6)’s stringent requirements
Whether an intervening change or clarification in law constitutes 'extraordinary circumstances' under Rule 60(b)(6)	Plaintiffs claimed a change in the legal standard for pleading warranted reopening	BLOM asserted changes in decisional law rarely meet the stringent standard for Rule 60(b)(6) relief	A mere legal development or clarification rarely constitutes 'extraordinary circumstances' per Rule 60(b)(6)
Whether deliberate litigation choices (such as refusing to amend) bar Rule 60(b)(6) relief	Plaintiffs argued that choosing to appeal rather than amend does not per se preclude reopening	BLOM maintained plaintiffs' choices demonstrated lack of diligence, weighing against Rule 60 relief	Court found that deliberate choices not to amend weighed against relief but (per concurrence) expressly did not categorically bar reopening if extraordinary circumstances exist

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (explains that a syllabus is not part of the Court's opinion)
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (establishes 'extraordinary circumstances' as the standard for Rule 60(b)(6) relief)
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (free, deliberate litigation choices generally not subject to Rule 60(b)(6) relief)
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (reiterates that Rule 60(b)(6) demands extraordinary circumstances for reopening)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (underscores strict application of Rule 60(b)(6) for the sake of finality)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (distinguishes between Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) for post-judgment amendments)
Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (clarifies appellate review standard for Rule 60(b) rulings)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (affirms abuse-of-discretion standard for review of Rule 60(b) rulings)