BLEVINS v. the STATE.
343 Ga. App. 539
Ga. Ct. App.2017Background
- Thomas H. Blevins, a middle/high school band director, was convicted of enticing a child for indecent purposes (OCGA § 16‑6‑5(a)) and four counts of child molestation (OCGA § 16‑6‑4(a)); acquitted of aggravated child molestation and false imprisonment.
- Victim B.P., age 14 at the time, testified Blevins lured her to the band storage room, assaulted her (digital and oral/sexual contact), and exchanged sexually explicit texts and requests for nude photos. Blevins later urged her to say nothing. Phone records showed thousands of texts between Blevins and multiple female students.
- The State introduced testimony from several other current/former female students (E.K., H.C., A.L., M.G., S.P.) and two colleagues about Blevins’ sexualized texts, touching, and conduct as “other acts” evidence.
- The court admitted prior‑acts evidence under OCGA §§ 24‑4‑413/414 (prior child‑molestation acts) and OCGA § 24‑4‑404(b) (other crimes/acts) after considering relevance and limiting instructions.
- Defense objected on grounds of undue prejudice, lack of same intent/motive, notice defects, improper closing argument (labeling defendant “creepy” and alleged Golden Rule), and challenged verdicts as repugnant; Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Blevins) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility under OCGA §§ 24‑4‑413/414 (E.K.) | Evidence of another child‑molestation offense is admissible to show intent and is highly probative. | Trial court failed to weigh probative value against unfair prejudice. | Affirmed — courts apply a strong presumption of admissibility; trial court did not abuse discretion. |
| Admissibility under OCGA § 24‑4‑404(b) (other students & colleagues) | Other acts show motive, intent, plan, and rebut fabrication; probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice. | Evidence lacked same intent/motive, was overly prejudicial and cumulative. | Affirmed — relevance and probative value upheld; limiting instructions and need to rebut credibility supported inclusion. |
| Notice and admissibility of S.P.’s father’s testimony | Notice listed S.P. and general nature; father’s testimony fell within that notice and was admissible. | State failed to list father by name, denying adequate notice and judicial consideration. | Affirmed — notice requirement satisfied; any error harmless and no prejudice shown. |
| Prosecutor’s closing argument ("creepy" and Golden Rule) | Remarks were reasonable inferences from admitted evidence and within scope of argument; jury instructed that arguments are not evidence. | Remarks improperly appealed to emotion; Golden Rule (urging jurors to imagine victim) was improper. | Affirmed — "creepy" remark permissible as inference; Golden Rule claim not preserved by objection at trial. |
| Motion in arrest of judgment — repugnant/inconsistent verdicts | N/A (State defends verdicts) | Conviction on a lesser count and acquittal on an overlapping/identical higher count are repugnant and require arrest of judgment. | Affirmed — Milam/Carter rule controls: inconsistent or repugnant verdicts are not a basis for reversal; Wiley overruled. |
Key Cases Cited
- Steele v. State, 337 Ga. App. 562 (Ga. App. 2016) (standard: abuse of discretion reviewing other‑acts admission)
- Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65 (Ga. 2016) (defines relevance/probative value for other‑acts and OCGA § 24‑4‑403 balancing)
- Dority v. State, 335 Ga. App. 83 (Ga. App. 2015) (intent is jury question for child‑molestation statutes)
- Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650 (Ga. 2015) (compare state of mind between extrinsic and charged offenses for relevance)
- Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722 (Ga. 2016) (standards for admissibility of extrinsic acts; burden on State)
- Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876 (Ga. 2011) (scope of proper closing argument tied to admitted evidence)
- Carter v. State, 298 Ga. 867 (Ga. 2016) (Milam rule: appellate courts cannot overturn inconsistent verdicts; rejects Wiley rationale)
- Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560 (Ga. 1986) (inconsistent‑verdict rule abolished)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict)
- U.S. v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1984) (inconsistent jury verdicts do not require reversal because rationale is unknowable)