31 F.4th 382
6th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiff Blanche Barber owns land abutting Mill Pond and alleges parts of her parcel extend into the pond; the Mill Pond Dam dates to 1836 and is jointly maintained by Springfield Township and Oakland County.
- Oakland County conducted a 2018 feasibility study; at a June 6, 2019 Township Board meeting the board recommended removal and the project entered a “Phase II – removal and restoration design/engineering” stage.
- Defendants contracted with engineering firms (AECOM) and budgeted funds for preliminary design; Barber sued (state court Oct. 28, 2019; removed Nov. 27, 2019) to enjoin dam removal, asserting a Fifth Amendment taking (via §1983) and state-law trespass claims and seeking a preliminary injunction.
- The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for Defendants, dismissing for lack of ripeness and standing without reaching the takings merits or Barber’s injunction request.
- The Sixth Circuit (majority) reversed, holding Barber’s takings claims were ripe and she had standing to seek injunctive relief, and remanded for consideration of the merits and the preliminary-injunction factors; Judge Readler dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ripeness of takings claim for injunctive relief | Board and county reached a final decision to remove the dam before suit; Cedar Point permits pre-taking injunctions for impending physical takings. | No final decision yet; removal speculative until demolition occurs and effects are known. | Reversed district court: defendants had reached a final decision; claim is ripe for injunctive relief under Cedar Point framework. |
| Standing (injury-in-fact for forward-looking injunctive relief) | Removal will imminently and concretely alter water flow on Barber’s land (parcel includes pond), risking flooding, property damage, value loss, and other concrete harms. | Alleged harms are speculative, attenuated, and uncertain in timing and scope; complaint lacks particularized imminent injury. | Reversed: Barber plausibly alleged a sufficiently imminent, concrete, and particularized risk of harm to satisfy injury-in-fact for injunctive relief. |
| Use of ripeness/standing doctrines vs. merits | Alleged facts showing decision-making, contracts, and engineering work demonstrate de facto finality and imminent harm without resolving takings viability. | Court should not adjudicate merits by assuming a taking; ripeness/standing require dismissal because merits questions remain. | Court cautioned not to conflate merits with justiciability; remanded for district court to consider merits and injunction factors. |
| Preliminary injunction (procedural) | Barber sought injunction to prevent demolition pending resolution; if justiciable, district court must weigh standard factors. | Defendants argued no entitlement because claims are unripe and lack standing. | Sixth Circuit remanded; did not rule on injunction merits, directing district court to assess likelihood of success and other factors. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (U.S. 2021) (a regulation that permits physical access can be a per se physical taking and plaintiffs may seek pre-taking injunctive relief)
- Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (U.S. 2019) (property owners may bring federal takings claims in federal court without first pursuing state compensation procedures)
- Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (final decision requirement for regulatory takings ripeness; discussed and applied in takings ripeness analysis)
- Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1967) (ripeness prevents premature adjudication and protects agencies from judicial interference before final decisions)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requires actual or imminent, concrete and particularized injury)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (speculative chains of possibilities do not satisfy injury-in-fact for injunctive relief)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (U.S. 2021) (clarifies concrete injury requirement and that imminent risk can support forward-looking relief)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (U.S. 2016) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury; risk of real harm can suffice)
- Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226 (U.S. 2021) (ripeness standard for takings claims requires only de facto finality in certain contexts)
- Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussion of ripeness for physical takings claims)