Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.
477 Mass. 141
| Mass. | 2017Background
- In spring 2011, reports of alleged patient abuse at Steward Carney Hospital’s adolescent psychiatric unit prompted an internal investigation by counsel Scott Harshbarger and an investigation by the Department of Mental Health (DMH). The hospital’s president, William Walczak, fired most unit nurses and sent an internal e-mail to staff and made statements to the Boston Globe explaining the firings as remedial steps based on Harshbarger’s report. DMH was considering revoking the unit’s license at the time.
- Nine discharged nurses sued the hospital and others in May 2013, including a defamation claim alleging Walczak’s Globe statements and the internal e-mail falsely implied the nurses were culpable for abuse and breaches of duty.
- The hospital filed a special motion to dismiss under Massachusetts’ anti‑SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The Superior Court denied the motion as to the e-mail and Globe statements; the Appeals Court reversed in part (allowed dismissal as to Globe statements, denied as to e-mail); the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review.
- The central legal question: whether the challenged communications constituted protected petitioning activity and whether the nurses’ defamation claim was “based on” that petitioning activity such that the anti‑SLAPP special motion could succeed.
- The SJC concluded Walczak’s Globe statements were petitioning activity (plausible nexus to DMH licensure proceedings) but the internal e-mail to employees was not (no plausible path to reach DMH). The Court modified the Duracraft framework governing anti‑SLAPP motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Walczak’s Globe statements and internal e‑mail are "petitioning activity" under § 59H | Nurses: statements are not petitioning; part of employment action and defamatory | Hospital: both communications were made in connection with ongoing DMH/licensure proceedings and thus petitioning | Globe statements = petitioning; internal e‑mail = not petitioning |
| Whether a special movant can meet threshold by showing only part of a claim is based on petitioning activity | Nurses: single defamation count combining petitioning and nonpetitioning conduct prevents partial dismissal | Hospital: may meet threshold as to the portion based on petitioning activity | Court: special movant can meet threshold for the portion of a claim based solely on petitioning activity |
| What must nonmoving party show at second stage to defeat special motion | Nurses: emphasize movant failed threshold; alternatively, claim that movant’s petitioning was a sham | Hospital: if threshold met, nurses must show petitioning was sham to avoid dismissal and fee award | Court: nonmoving party may defeat motion either by proving petitioning was a sham or by showing the suit was not "brought primarily to chill" petitioning (i.e., not a SLAPP) |
| Proper remedy and remand instructions | Nurses: keep defamation claim intact because mixed bases | Hospital: dismiss Globe-based portion and obtain fees if nurses cannot meet burden | Court: vacated denial as to Globe statements, remanded for nurses to meet amended second-stage burden; if they fail, dismiss Globe-based portion and award appropriate fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156 (1998) (established threshold “solely based on” test and Duracraft framework for anti‑SLAPP motions)
- Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 (2002) (special movant’s right to interlocutory appeal and scope of petitioning activity inquiry)
- Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543 (2001) (second‑stage burden: nonmoving party must show petitioning activity lacked reasonable factual or legal basis to prove sham)
- North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852 (2009) (analyzing statements in overall context to determine nexus to governmental proceeding)
- Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113 (2002) (communications directly to governmental bodies qualify as petitioning activity)
- Wenger v. Aceto, 451 Mass. 1 (2008) (count‑by‑count analysis in anti‑SLAPP context)
- Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148 (2009) (discussing nonmoving party’s burden to rebut petitioning as sham)
- Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31 (2016) (treatment of second‑stage anti‑SLAPP burden)
- Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479 (2017) (clarifying petitioning‑activity definitions and constitutional considerations)
- Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 442 Mass. 660 (2004) (consideration of plaintiff’s purpose and merit in anti‑SLAPP context)