Blanchard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 30 A.3d 1271

Plaintiff Blanchard was diagnosed with Primary CNS Large B-Cell Lymphoma at age 49 and alleges benzene exposure from Goodyear plant activities between 1968 and 1973.
He contends that pollution on the Goodyear field and a gully transporting oily discharge carried benzene from the plant to the ballfield where he played as a teenager.
Goodyear and CRDC moved for summary judgment in 2009; the superior court granted both motions in 2010, concluding no substantial evidence of exposure or causation.
Evidence proffered included (a) lay statements about field conditions, (b) a 2009 environmental report suggesting possible benzene-containing petroleum contaminants, and (c) two medical experts linking benzene to NHL generally.
The court distinguished general causation from specific causation and found the evidence insufficient to permit a jury verdict on causation.
Plaintiff appeals, arguing the circumstantial evidence and expert testimony were enough to present causation to a jury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether circumstantial evidence supports causation.	Blanchard's evidence suggests exposure to benzene in the field.	Evidence does not show exposure or dose sufficient to cause disease.	No; evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of causation.
Whether general and specific causation were shown by epidemiology and exposure data.	Epidemiology shows association; relative risks support causation.	No proof exposure level or dose; studies insufficient for individual causation.	No; relative risk threshold not met and individual causation not proven.
Whether differential diagnosis can support specific causation here.	Differential diagnosis may establish specific causation with limited exposure data.	Differential diagnosis cannot substitute for exposure measurement and known etiologies.	No; differential diagnosis fails given lack of exposure data and unknown etiology.
Whether expert testimony suffices to take the case to a jury.	Experts link benzene exposure to NHL and to this patient's subtype.	Experts cannot establish exposure amount or direct causal link for this patient.	No; experts do not provide probability-based specific causation or exposure details.
Whether spoliation arguments create an inference in plaintiff's favor.	Goodyear may have spoliated records showing benzene release.	Plaintiff lacks legal basis and evidence of spoliation; no inference warranted.	No; no supported inference from alleged spoliation.

Bland v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, 538 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2008) (most cases of unknown origin require more than differential diagnosis to establish causation)
George v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns, 187 Vt. 229, 993 A.2d 367 (2010 VT 1) (epidemiology informs general causation; not sufficient for specific causation without exposure data)
Plourde v. Gladstone, 190 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D. Vt. 2002) (differential diagnosis with rough exposure must be supported by plausible exposure data)
Henricksen v. Conoco-Phillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (reliance on exposure amount and inoculation of etiologies required for causation)
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (definition of differential diagnosis and limitation when exposure is unknown)
Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines, 8 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1993) (courts guard against speculation in causation proofs)