Blakeney v. United States, 2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 647

Background

Michael Blakeney was convicted of first-degree murder in 2007; post-conviction he moved to vacate under D.C. Code § 23-110 claiming ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to raise competency.
Defense retained psychologist Dr. Dwight Colley (one brief interview, oral report) who opined Blakeney was not competent; counsel nonetheless relied on their extensive, ongoing interactions with Blakeney and did not raise competency because they believed he was competent and he objected.
Trial judge denied the § 23-110 motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding no prejudice because there was no reasonable probability a competency finding would have been reached pretrial.
After reconsideration and submission of a new psychiatrist’s report (Dr. Crowley), the court ordered a retrospective evaluation at St. Elizabeths; its clinicians (Dr. Johnson and a psychologist) concluded Blakeney was competent in 2007.
On rehearing the judge found (1) counsel did not perform deficiently (they could weigh an expert opinion against their own observations), and (2) Blakeney was not prejudiced because a valid retrospective determination was possible and he was in fact competent at trial.

Issues

Issue	Blakeney's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether defense counsel’s failure to raise competency claim was constitutionally deficient	Counsel had an unrebutted expert opinion of incompetence (Dr. Colley); failure to raise it is per se deficient	Counsel reasonably discounted a preliminary/limited expert opinion based on prolonged, direct interactions showing competence	Court adopts objective "reasonable-counsel" trigger: counsel must raise competency when objectively reasonable counsel would have reason to doubt; declined bright-line per se rule; close call but need not decide deficiency finally
Whether defendant is entitled to a presumption of prejudice when counsel fails to raise competency	Presumption of prejudice because retrospective determination may be infeasible	No presumption; defendant must show reasonable probability court would have found him incompetent	No presumption; defendant must show prejudice by reasonable probability; here no prejudice because retrospective evaluation was feasible and judge found competence at trial
Whether a valid retrospective competency determination was feasible and reliable	Argued retrospective evaluation unreliable, so uncertainty should defeat prejudice inquiry	Contemporaneous records, letters, trial judge’s observations, counsel testimony, and expert examinations made retrospective inquiry feasible	Court affirmed trial judge: retrospective determination was feasible and judge did not abuse discretion in finding Blakeney competent in 2007
Standard triggering counsel’s duty to alert court to competency concerns	Urged bright-line rule: an unrebutted expert opinion mandates raising competency	Advocated flexible standard allowing counsel to weigh expert opinion against other evidence and interactions	Court adopts objective reasonable-doubt standard (what objectively reasonable counsel would conclude) but rejects bright-line automatic rule for every expert opinion

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective-assistance two-prong standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (trial of incompetent defendant violates due process; courts must inquire when doubt exists)
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (competency standard: rational and factual understanding and ability to consult with counsel)
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (discusses burdens/standards for competency determinations and retrospective difficulty)
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (trial court obligation to hold a competency hearing when evidence raises doubt)
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (due process prohibits prosecution of incompetent defendants)
Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106 (D.C. guidance on counsel’s role and reasonableness in competence inquiries)