917 F. Supp. 2d 647
E.D. Ky.2013Background
- Automobile accident in June 2009; Blair sued GEI-CO for PIP benefits, GEICO paid part and then stopped after physician evaluation.
- Blair’s initial PIP claim in Laurel County District Court led to a subsequent settlement with the tortfeasor for policy limits ($25,000).
- Blair filed a UIM claim against GEICO in Laurel County Circuit Court during the PIP action; GEICO eventually paid remaining PIP but disputed interest, costs, and fees.
- February 6, 2012, Laurel County District Court granted GEICO’s summary judgment and dismissed Blair’s PIP claims with prejudice.
- GEICO removed Blair’s remaining UIM claim to federal court, arguing res judicata and that Blair’s late expert disclosures violated scheduling orders and the Federal Rules, seeking dismissal with prejudice.
- Magistrate Judge Atkins issued protective orders excluding Blair’s expert disclosures and Blair’s treating physician, leading to GEICO’s second motion for summary judgment and this court’s eventual grant of that motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Res judicata/splitting applicability | Blair argues exceptions to splitting apply; the UIM claim ripened early and is not barred | GEICO asserts same-transaction rule requires bringing PIP and UIM together | Res judicata not barred; splitting exceptions apply; summary judgment denied as to this issue. |
| Rule 37(c)(1) exclusion of expert testimony | Disclosures were late but harmless; the expert should be allowed | Late/untimely disclosures are prohibited and must be excluded | Rule 37(c)(1) mandatory exclusion approved; Blair’s expert testimony excluded. |
| Causation proof without medical expert | Jury could determine causation from lay evidence | Causation requires medical testimony under Kentucky law | Causation cannot be shown without expert or admitted medical proof; Blair cannot prove UIM element. |
| Ripeness/exceptions to splitting under Kentucky law | UIM claim ripe at time of first claim; exceptions apply | Ripeness does not save second action under the facts; split claims impermissible | Second exception applies only if not germane to second case; here not satisfied; res judicata does not bar the UIM claim per se. |
| Identity of issues and insurance-transaction overlap | PIP and UIM involve different issues; no identity of claims | Arise from same accident and policy; identity of issues present | Identity of issues lacking; res judicata not to bar Blair’s UIM claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Coots v. Allstate, 853 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.1993) (establishes ripeness and causation considerations for UIM claims under Kentucky law)
- Kirchner v. Riherd, 702 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.1985) (identity of issues analysis for split actions applies to similar transactions)
- Rawe v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.2006) ( Sixth Circuit on relation of multiple claims arising from same accident)
- Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150 (6th Cir.1993) (summary judgment standard in federal court)
- Hayes v. Equitable Energy Resources Co., 266 F.3d 560 (6th Cir.2001) (diversity/specific Rule 56 application)
- Smith v. Bob Smith Chevrolet Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d 808 (W.D.Ky.2003) (res judicata and splitting in Kentucky context)
- Tatham v. Palmer, 439 S.W.2d 938 (Ky.1969) (lay juror causation exception to medical proof)