Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213

In May 2007 Blair contracted with Tigerlilly and Bonanza involving reconveyance of Blair's residence; Burgener controlled Tigerlilly and Bonanza as his alter egos.
Blair filed a May 2008 complaint alleging breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and fraud.
Blair repeatedly attempted personal service at the defendants' Phoenix office and Burgener's Phoenix residence without success.
Blair sought and the trial court granted alternate service on any person in charge of the office and ordered mailing to last known addresses.
The process server served at the business address and mailed copies; Blair obtained a default judgment on November 12, 2008 for $252,000.
In June 2009 Appellants moved to set aside the default; the trial court denied, and Appellants appealed claiming improper service and void judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether service via alternate means was permissible under Rule 4.1(m).	Blair showed impracticability of personal service under Rule 4.1(m).	Burgener, Tigerlilly, Bonanza argued impracticability was not shown; service should be impossible.	Yes; trial court did not abuse discretion in finding impracticability warranting alternate service.
Whether the alternate service violated due process.	Service to the office's front desk and mail to last known address reasonably notified defendants.	Service was not reasonably calculated to inform defendants of the action.	No; service complied with due process under Rule 4.1(m) and the court's order.
Whether Blair complied with the trial court's order for alternate service.	Blair mailed to the last known addresses and served the office; documents were properly re-mailed when necessary.	Mailing and exact documentary details did not strictly satisfy the order.	Yes; Blair strictly complied with the order and service was proper.

Ezell v. Quon, 224 Ariz. 532 (App. 2010) (view facts in favor of trial court ruling on default petitions)
Goglia v. Bodnar, 156 Ariz. 12 (App. 1987) (standard for reviewing motions to set aside defaults)
Harper v. Canyon Land Dev., L.L.C., 219 Ariz. 535 (App. 2008) (default judgments not favored; abuse of discretion standard)
Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 (App. 1984) (abuse of discretion standard for setting aside defaults)
Almarez v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 189 (App. 1985) (criteria for relief from default under Rule 60(c))
Master Fin., Inc. v. Woodburn, 208 Ariz. 70 (App. 2004) (void judgment exception to relief standards)
Miller v. Nat'l Franchise Servs., Inc., 167 Ariz. 403 (App. 1991) (burden to show entitlement to set aside default)
Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106 (App. 2005) (credibility and factual disputes resolved by trial court)
Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Osterkamp, 172 Ariz. 191 (App. 1992) (service of process standards and due process considerations)
Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257 (App. 1990) (due diligence considerations for notice in alternative service)
Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. App. 181 (App. 1972) (notice requirements and impracticability concepts)
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (S. Ct. 1950) (due process notice and reasonableness of notice methods)