Blackmore v. L & D Development Inc.
382 P.3d 655
Utah Ct. App.2016Background
- In 2002 Blackmore (L. Lane Blackmore, BCDC, The Home Company) and Shadow Canyon (L&D Development et al.) entered a Development Agreement under which Shadow Canyon would convey property to BCDC and Blackmore would cure certain debts, pay $50,000 at closing, pay taxes, and develop/sell homes. Closing date was not fixed; taxes due Nov. 30, 2002.
- Blackmore performed some obligations (sold three homes, paid one bank) but did not pay taxes, U.S. Bank interest, or the $50,000; Shadow Canyon did not convey title and instead sold the property to Shadow Glen 420 in January 2003.
- Blackmore sued Shadow Canyon and Lindhardt entities for breach of contract, specific performance, and related claims; liability questions and remedies proceeded to trial after interlocutory appeals and procedural rulings.
- Procedurally: Judge Shumate recused himself after an interlocutory appeal; Judge Stott later set aside Shumate’s 2008 summary-judgment order that had found Shadow Canyon’s breach material as a matter of law. At trial the jury found both that Shadow Canyon materially breached and that Blackmore abandoned his rights; consequently Blackmore obtained no contract recovery.
- Posttrial, the court denied Blackmore’s JNOV motion on abandonment and awarded attorney fees to defendants as “prevailing party”; on appeal the court affirmed most rulings but vacated the fee award, holding the contract’s fee clause applies to a defaulting party (not a prevailing-party standard), and Blackmore’s abandonment precluded recovery of contractual fees.
Issues
| Issue | Blackmore's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judge Shumate’s recusal | Recusal was improper because no Rule 63 motion was filed and procedures weren’t followed | Recusal permissible; judges may recuse sua sponte when impartiality might reasonably be questioned | Affirmed: judge did not abuse discretion in recusing himself; sua sponte recusal allowed under judicial-conduct rule |
| Setting aside 2008 summary-judgment order (law-of-the-case) | Judge Stott erred by reversing Shumate’s order; law of the case blocked reconsideration | New judge may revisit interlocutory rulings; law-of-the-case/mandate not implicated | Affirmed: trial judge had discretion to revisit interlocutory summary judgment; law-of-the-case did not bar reconsideration |
| Sufficiency of evidence for abandonment (JNOV) | Evidence insufficient; Blackmore did not clearly and unequivocally abandon the contract | Evidence (statements, communications, witnesses) supported jury finding of abandonment | Affirmed: reasonable evidence supported jury’s abandonment finding; JNOV properly denied |
| Award of attorney fees to Shadow Canyon and Blackmore’s claim for fees | Because jury found Shadow Canyon breached, Blackmore argued it should recover fees under contract’s ‘‘defaulting party’’ clause | Defendants argued they were the prevailing parties (so fees proper) and that Blackmore’s abandonment barred his fee claim | Reversed-in-part: vacated trial court’s award to defendants (trial court wrongly applied prevailing-party statute instead of contract wording). Blackmore not entitled to fees because his abandonment rendered contractual fee relief moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003) (standard for viewing facts in light most favorable to jury verdict)
- Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (material breach analysis concerning breach that goes to the heart of the contract)
- IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 196 P.3d 588 (Utah 2008) (district court discretion to revisit interlocutory rulings on remand)
- McLaughlin v. Schenk, 299 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2013) (replacement judge may revisit prior in-case rulings; law-of-the-case doctrine explained)
- Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001) (appellate deference to jury credibility and sufficiency-of-evidence standard)
- Watkins v. Henry Day Ford, 304 P.3d 841 (Utah 2013) (elements and standard of proof for contract abandonment)
- Jones v. Riche, 216 P.3d 357 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (contractual fee clause requiring defaulting party to pay must be enforced as written; prevailing-party statute cannot be used to override contract terms)