Blackmon v. Huntington Ingalls
1:15-cv-00313
| S.D. Miss. | Aug 25, 2015Background
- Plaintiff Eric D. Blackmon, proceeding pro se, sued Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (HII) under the ADA alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate, after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.
- Blackmon filed the complaint in the Southern District of Alabama on April 28, 2015; the EEOC charge was submitted to the Mobile, Alabama EEOC office.
- HII moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue; HII submitted an affidavit stating Blackmon worked at HII’s Pascagoula, Mississippi facility, did not work in Alabama, and employment records are maintained in Mississippi.
- Magistrate Judge recommended denying dismissal but granting transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), finding venue improper in the Southern District of Alabama.
- Court applied Title VII/ADA venue provisions (42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑5(f)(3)), concluding none of the statutory venue bases applied to Alabama (violation location, records location, or place plaintiff would have worked), and HII’s principal office is in Virginia.
- Transfer (rather than dismissal) was ordered in the interest of justice to avoid time‑bar dismissal given the 90‑day filing window after the right‑to‑sue letter.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue is proper in the Southern District of Alabama under the ADA/Title VII venue rules | Blackmon points to filing his EEOC charge at the Mobile, AL EEOC office and receipt of a notice of suit rights there | HII argues the alleged discrimination occurred in Pascagoula, MS, records are in MS, and HII’s principal office is in VA, so Alabama is not a proper venue | Venue is improper in the Southern District of Alabama; none of the statutory venue bases apply |
| Whether the court should dismiss for improper venue or transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) | Implicit: Blackmon seeks to proceed in this forum | HII sought dismissal or transfer; argued court lacks personal jurisdiction and venue is improper | Court declined dismissal and ordered transfer to the Southern District of Mississippi in the interest of justice to avoid statute of limitations bar |
| Whether court must decide personal jurisdiction before venue | Not directly argued by Blackmon | HII asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as alternative ground | Court did not reach personal jurisdiction, noting § 1406(a) transfer can cure venue/jurisdiction defects and transfer is appropriate without resolving jurisdiction |
| Effect of filing EEOC charge in Mobile, AL on venue | Blackmon contended filing with Mobile EEOC supports venue | HII argued EEOC filing location does not control federal-court venue under Title VII/ADA | Court held EEOC office location does not make venue proper where statutory venue factors point elsewhere |
Key Cases Cited
- Pritchett v. Paschall Truck Lines, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (transfer favored over dismissal where dismissal would time‑bar plaintiff under Title VII time limits)
- Pinson v. Rumsfeld, [citation="192 F. App'x 811"] (11th Cir. 2006) (Title VII venue provisions are exclusive and plaintiff bears burden to establish proper venue)
- Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (§ 1406(a) authorizes transfer in the interest of justice even where venue was wrong)
- Berry v. Salter, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (§ 1406(a) broad enough to permit transfer despite venue and jurisdiction defects)