486 F.Supp.3d 988
E.D.N.C.2020Background
- Plaintiffs are nonresident owners of a fee-simple vacation home in Frisco, Dare County, NC; they claim they were barred from accessing the property during the county’s COVID-19 emergency orders.
- Dare County declared a state of emergency in mid‑March 2020 and, between March 20 and May 8, 2020, issued a restriction barring nonresident property owners from entering the county (with partial lifts May 4 and May 6 and full lift May 8).
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the travel ban was a taking without just compensation (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); they asserted individual and putative class claims.
- Dare County moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a takings claim; the six Town defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(1) asserting lack of Article III standing.
- The court concluded the Towns lacked standing and that the County’s restriction did not constitute either a physical or compensable regulatory taking, and granted both motions, dismissing the case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing of Town defendants | Plaintiffs contended class claims and a “juridical link” permit suit against Towns | Towns argued plaintiffs’ alleged injury was traceable to County action, not Towns, so no Article III standing | Towns lacked standing; motion to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction granted |
| Physical taking by County | The travel ban was a temporary complete taking—denial of all use during the Declaration | County argued there was no government appropriation or possession of plaintiffs’ property | Not a physical taking; no transfer of possession or control to government |
| Regulatory taking (Penn Central test) | Plaintiffs claimed loss of fair rental value/use for 45 days amounted to a taking | County argued the restriction was a temporary, public‑health regulation distributing burdens broadly and serving reciprocal public benefits | Under Penn Central factors, plaintiffs’ claim fails: economic impact and allegations insufficient; character of action (public health emergency) weighs against finding a taking; dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) granted |
| Class/juridical‑link doctrine | Plaintiffs urged juridical link can allow class claims against Towns | Defendants and court held Article III requires the named plaintiffs themselves to have standing; juridical link does not cure lack of standing | Juridical link does not cure Article III standing; class theory cannot save claims against Towns |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (standing requires concrete injury in fact)
- Town of Chester v. LaRoe Estates, 137 S. Ct. 1645 (U.S. 2017) (standing standard for compensatory relief)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2005) (framework for regulatory takings analysis)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (ad hoc takings factors)
- Tahoe‑Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (U.S. 2002) (temporary moratoria and parcel‑as‑a‑whole analysis)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (categorical taking when regulation deprives all economically beneficial use)
- Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (U.S. 2012) (temporary government‑induced invasions can be takings depending on character/duration)
- Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1928) (police‑power measures protecting public health/interest weigh against takings finding)
- Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576 U.S. 350 (U.S. 2015) (government reserve requirement as physical taking)