478 F.Supp.3d 1278
N.D. Ga.2020Background
- Plaintiffs (Black Voters Matter Fund, Megan Gordon, Penelope Reid) challenged Georgia’s practice of requiring voters to affix postage to absentee ballot applications and return envelopes, seeking a declaration and injunction requiring prepaid postage or prepaid envelopes.
- Georgia law requires absentee ballots and return envelopes but does not specify who must pay return postage; Secretary Raffensperger mailed absentee-application forms to active voters in spring 2020 but did not include prepaid postage for returns.
- COVID-19 prompted emergency rules allowing secured drop boxes in many counties; however, some counties had no drop boxes and many voters feared in-person voting because of infection risk.
- Plaintiffs submitted voter declarations and expert reports (epidemiology and voting-access analyses) asserting postage imposes burdens—especially on low-income, rural, elderly, disabled, and minority voters—and that organizations must divert resources to help obtain postage.
- The court held an evidentiary hearing, found organizational and individual standing (at least for Black Voters Matter Fund), but after reviewing evidence denied a preliminary injunction: Count I (poll-tax Twenty-Fourth/Equal Protection claim) dismissed; Count II (Anderson–Burdick vote‑burden claim) survived dismissal but preliminary relief was denied on the expedited record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether requiring voters to pay postage for absentee ballots is a "poll tax" (Twenty-Fourth Amendment / Equal Protection) | Postage is a prerequisite monetary cost to vote absentee and thus a de facto poll tax that disenfranchises low‑income and vulnerable voters. | Voters can still vote in person without postage; postage is an incidental cost analogous to travel/time, and alternatives (drop boxes, USPS delivery without postage) exist. | Court: No substantial likelihood of success on poll‑tax claim; Count I dismissed. In‑person voting option forecloses treating postage as a Twenty‑Fourth Amendment poll tax. |
| Whether postage requirement unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote under Anderson–Burdick (First/Fourteenth Amendments) | The postage requirement, amid COVID‑19, imposes at least a moderate-to-severe burden because many cannot safely vote in person, making mail voting the only viable option. | State has legitimate interests (fiscal limits, administrative efficiency, fraud prevention); it has taken measures (mailing applications, funding sanitization, enabling drop boxes); burden is modest and alternatives exist. | Court: Plaintiffs stated a cognizable Anderson–Burdick claim (Count II survives motion to dismiss) but failed to show a substantial likelihood of success for preliminary injunctive relief on the expedited record; injunction denied. |
| Standing of organizational plaintiff (BVMF) and individuals | BVMF: must divert resources to assist voters obtain postage and educate about postage; individuals: fear of COVID‑19 and practical inability to obtain postage. | Defendants: diversion allegations are routine voter‑education activities or speculative; injuries not fairly traceable to Secretary or are hypothetical. | Court: BVMF demonstrated diversion‑of‑resources standing; at least one named individual plaintiff’s standing not required for all claims; overall standing sufficient to proceed. |
| Preliminary injunction standard and balancing (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, public interest) | Plaintiffs argued irreparable harm from disenfranchisement and health risks if forced to vote in person; request was narrowly tailored (prepaid postage). | Defendants emphasized administrative/financial burdens, alternatives available, and electoral stability concerns (Purcell). | Court: Harm and public‑interest concerns recognized but, given record gaps and state interests/alternatives, plaintiffs did not meet the high burden for preliminary injunctive relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (Twenty‑Fourth Amendment bars substitute burdens that condition federal voting on payments or cumbersome alternatives)
- Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Equal Protection prohibits conditioning franchise on payment or wealth)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (framework for balancing burdens on voting against state interests)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (refines Anderson balancing; severe burdens require strict scrutiny)
- Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upheld voter‑ID law; noted that requiring fees for ID could raise Harper concerns)
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (courts should be cautious changing election rules close to an election)
- Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) (requiring identity documents that may cost money is not necessarily a poll tax)
- Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (costs for documentation underlying voter‑ID laws do not automatically constitute a poll tax)
- Jacobson v. Florida Sec'y of State, 957 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2020) (organizational standing/diversion‑of‑resources principles in election challenges)