Black v. Autovest LLC
2:15-cv-00773
D. Ariz.Dec 28, 2015Background
- In 2008 Black bought a car and executed a retail installment sales contract later assigned to Wells Fargo; the car was repossessed and sold, leaving an alleged deficiency.
- Autovest later acquired the contract and hired Fulton Friedman & Gullace to collect the deficiency; Autovest sued Black in Arizona state court in May 2014 and obtained a default judgment for about $30,221.56.
- Black filed this federal suit under the FDCPA and Arizona common law (unreasonable debt collection, invasion of privacy), alleging the state suit was time-barred and that defendants knowingly filed/litigated beyond the statute of limitations.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Black’s federal claims are (1) barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and (2) compulsory counterclaims that should have been raised in state court; they also sought judicial notice of state-court pleadings and the judgment.
- The district court granted judicial notice of the state-court documents, dismissed Black’s invasion-of-privacy claim (Black voluntarily withdrew it), and denied defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion, holding Black’s FDCPA claims may proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker–Feldman bars Black’s FDCPA claims | Black contends he challenges defendants’ pre- and during-litigation conduct (filing a time-barred suit), not the state judgment | Defendants say the federal suit is a de facto appeal that seeks to undercut the state-court judgment | Rooker–Feldman does not bar the claims because Black challenges defendants’ conduct, not an alleged legal error by the state court; not a de facto appeal |
| Whether Black’s claims are compulsory counterclaims barred by claim preclusion | Black argues his FDCPA claims (collection methods) are distinct from the state action’s debt-collection claim | Defendants assert those claims arose from the same transaction and thus had to be raised in state court | Claims are not compulsory counterclaims under Arizona law because they do not arise from the same transaction/subject matter as the state suit |
| Whether the court may consider state-court pleadings and judgment on the motion | Black did not dispute authenticity; documents are public records | Defendants requested judicial notice to support their Rule 12(c) motion | Court took judicial notice of the state-court complaint, service records, and judgment under Fed. R. Evid. 201 |
| Scope of relief on motion for judgment on the pleadings | Black seeks to proceed with FDCPA claims; withdrew invasion-of-privacy claim | Defendants sought dismissal of all claims via Rule 12(c) | Court denied Rule 12(c) as to FDCPA claims, dismissed invasion-of-privacy claim (voluntary withdrawal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (U.S.) (establishes that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review final state-court judgments)
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (U.S.) (limits federal review of state-court judicial decisions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S.) (plausibility standard for pleading under Rule 8)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S.) (clarifies pleading standard and rejects conclusory allegations)
- Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir.) (two-step test to determine whether Rooker–Feldman bars federal claims)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S.) (discusses doctrine precluding federal district review of state-court judgments)
- Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir.) (summarizes Rooker–Feldman and explains de facto appeal concept)
- Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855 (9th Cir.) (example where federal claims were treated as barred by Rooker–Feldman in light of state-court adjudication)