Bishop v. Arcuri
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4978
5th Cir.2012Background
- Informant tips Arcuri to meth activity at a Leon Valley house; warrant issued by a magistrate; Arcuri proceeded to a no-knock entry approved by a supervisor; seven SAPD detectives and one Leon Valley officer entered with a ram at ~9:40 p.m.; occupants Clark and Bishop were present and subjected to questions; search yielded no drugs or evidence and lasted about 1 hour 45 minutes.
- Plaintiffs allege Fourth Amendment violation (no-knock entry) and City/Officer liability; district court granted summary judgment on most claims but denied on no-knock claim; appellate review granted.
- Evidence showed no definite occupants identity, no known Randy, and no observed evidence destruction; district court and magistrate differed but no-knock entry challenged on reasonableness.
- Court analyzes whether exigent circumstances justified no-knock entry; ultimately finds no exigent circumstances established by particularized facts.
- Conclusion: no-knock entry violated Fourth Amendment; City liable on municipal liability; case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether no-knock entry was justified by exigent circumstances | Appellants: no exigent facts; requires knock-and-announce. | Arcuri: concerns about evidence destruction and officer safety justified no-knock entry. | No exigent circumstances; no-knock entry unreasonable. |
| Whether Arcuri is entitled to qualified immunity | Rights clearly established; Richards prohibits blanket no-knock rule. | Argues safety/evidence concerns; reliance on generalities. | Not entitled to qualified immunity; right was clearly established. |
| Whether City is liable under Monell for SAPD policy/custom | SAPD had a custom of no-knock entries under less than reasonable suspicion. | Policies otherwise constitutional; no witness of custom. | Genuine issue of material fact exists; municipal liability can be inferred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (no-knock analysis requires exigent circumstances based on particularized facts; blanket rule rejected)
- Banks v. United States, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (wait time after knock-and-announce depends on exigency; not to permit blanket no-knock entry)
- Cantu v. United States, 230 F.3d 148 (2000) (no-knock entries disallowed based on mere drug-distribution assumptions; need particularized facts)
- Valdez v. United States, 302 F.3d 320 (2002) (no-knock entry inappropriate where no pointed evidence of destruction; relies on Richards/its progeny)
- Washington v. United States, 340 F.3d 222 (2003) (no-knock entry allowed only with particularized danger; blanket generalizations rejected)
- Linbrugger v. Abercia, 363 F.3d 537 (2004) (no-knock entry may be reasonable without particularized armed-suspect knowledge; requires facts showing danger)