Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo County
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13037
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- The Bishop Paiute Tribe (federally recognized) operates an 875-acre reservation in Inyo County, CA, with a tribal police department (Tribal PD) that enforces civil tribal ordinances (nuisance, trespass, public safety) and may detain non‑Indians to turn them over to outside authorities.
- On December 24, 2014, Tribal PD Officer Daniel Johnson detained and used a Taser on a non‑Indian suspect for alleged violations of tribal and state protective orders; county officers later investigated and released the suspect.
- The Inyo County District Attorney filed felony charges against Johnson; the Inyo County Sheriff then issued a January 6, 2015 cease‑and‑desist letter ordering Tribal PD to stop enforcing California law and threatening arrest/prosecution for continued activity.
- The Tribe replied, disputing ICSO’s legal conclusions but stating, as a show of good faith, that Tribal PD would not exercise California peace‑officer authority on or off the reservation and would carry firearms only on reservation; the Tribe did not concede it lacked inherent authority to perform certain policing functions.
- The Tribe filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that its officers have authority to investigate, detain, and deliver non‑Indian violators to proper authorities and that prosecution of Tribal officers interferes with federal common‑law tribal sovereignty; defendants moved to dismiss.
- The district court dismissed for lack of an Article III case or controversy (mootness/ripeness). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding subject‑matter jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal common law) and the case was ripe and not moot, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject‑matter jurisdiction (federal question) | Tribe: federal common law protects inherent tribal authority to detain and deliver non‑Indian violators, so § 1331 applies | County: complaint fails to present a federal question; federal statutes (e.g., ILERA) displace common law | Held: § 1331 covers federal common‑law claims; Tribe adequately pleaded a federal question and ILERA does not displace the asserted common‑law authority |
| Ripeness (pre‑enforcement challenge) | Tribe: actual injury and imminent threat—officer arrested, cease‑and‑desist letter threatens prosecution; costs and interference with tribal governance exist | County: challenge is premature; Tribe lacks a concrete plan to violate any law | Held: constitutional and prudential ripeness satisfied—concrete past prosecution, credible threat, detailed factual record |
| Mootness (effect of Tribe’s response letter) | Tribe: response disputed ICSO’s legal conclusions and reserved rights; letter did not resolve controversy | County: Tribe’s letter effectively agreed to cease conduct, mooting the dispute | Held: Not moot—the Tribe’s letter did not concede legal claims and sought further meetings; live controversy remains |
| Scope of tribal policing authority (merits—limited) | Tribe: inherent sovereignty permits detention and delivery of non‑Indian violators on reservation | County: tribal officers lack authority to enforce state law; federal scheme governs | Held: Court need not decide merits now; noted Tribe has at least a colorable federal common‑law claim and remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Daniels‑Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (pleading‑stage standard: accept well‑pleaded facts as true)
- Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (§ 1331 jurisdiction extends to federal common‑law claims)
- Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1980) (federal common law in Indian law context can supply federal jurisdiction)
- Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (discussion of limits of tribal criminal jurisdiction)
- Ortiz‑Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975) (recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty to exclude trespassers and deliver offenders)
- Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (principles of tribal sovereignty and jurisdictional limits)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing—injury in fact requirements)
- Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (ripeness doctrine—constitutional and prudential components)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (ripeness—fitness and hardship factors)
- Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2012) (ripeness/standing where statute had been enforced)
- Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (test for whether statute displaces federal common law)