Bishawi v. Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, 628 F. App'x 339

Bishawi, a former federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Bivens-like civil rights action against NEOCC, CCA, and fourteen NEOCC employees.
The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A/e, holding private prison defendants cannot be sued under § 1983 for Bivens claims.
The court found no state-actor liability, limited remedies under Minneci and Malesko, and dismissed various claims as failing to state a claim or duplicative.
Bishawi filed a Rule 59(e) motion challenging the district court’s decisions and seeking reconsideration, including arguments based on NEOCC’s state-actor status under contract with the City of Youngstown.
On appeal, Bishawi asserts state-actor status for § 1983, pleading standards, Rule 59(e) outcomes, amendment opportunities, and discretionary handling of related issues.
The panel reverses as to one equal-protection issue against Gozman, and affirms otherwise and remands for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NEOCC/CCA are state actors for § 1983	Bishawi contends the prison contract with Youngstown renders NEOCC state actor.	District court held private prison and its employees not acting under state law for § 1983.	No state-actor liability; § 1983 inapplicable.
Whether the district court applied a heightened pleading standard for Bivens retaliation	Bishawi argues Rule 8 applies; no heightened standard.	Court properly applied standard from Iqbal and Hill.	Rule 8 adequacy applied; no heightened standard.
Whether denial of Rule 59(e) relief and related remedies was proper	Bishawi argues district court abused discretion in denying relief and in not allowing amendment.	District court appropriately denied relief; amendment not required.	No abuse; remand limited to equal-protection issue.
Whether equal protection claim against Gozman survives	Religious animus shown by comments about being Muslim and threat to Christians.	Gozman’s statements two months after initial segregation do not prove motive.	Equal protection claim against Gozman survives 1915(e) dismissal (reversed in part).

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (private entity liability under § 1983 requires state action or its equivalent)
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (private prison staff as state actors in limited circumstances)
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (Bivens not extended to private entities under private ownership of prisons)
Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012) (Bivens remedies unavailable where state tort remedies exist)
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of § 1915A dismissal; pleading standards)
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards require more than mere conclusory allegations)
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (freedom from indefinite segregation implicates due process)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment standards for prisoners)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (standard for Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement)
Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2003) (pleading requirement for § 1985 claims)
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2003) (elements of § 1985 conspiracy)