Binschus v. Department of Corrections, 186 Wash. 2d 573

Background

Isaac Zamora was detained at Skagit County Jail April 4–May 29, 2008, transferred to Okanogan County, and released August 2, 2008; on September 2, 2008 he committed a mass shooting that killed six people.
Plaintiffs (victims and families) sued Skagit County alleging negligence during Zamora’s Skagit incarceration: inadequate mental-health evaluation, failure to diagnose/treat, and failure to transfer full records.
Trial court granted summary judgment for Skagit County, finding no duty to prevent crimes after lawful release and no proximate cause as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding factual disputes on duty and proximate cause; the Washington Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court majority affirmed summary judgment: a jail’s § 319 “take charge” duty is a duty to control during the custodial relationship, not a broad duty to prevent all foreseeable post-release crimes.
The majority acknowledged narrow exceptions (e.g., negligent escape shortly before release; independent duty under Restatement § 302B for affirmative acts creating risk) but found them inapplicable here.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Skagit owed a § 319 "take charge" duty to victims for harms occurring after lawful release	Skagit breached a take-charge duty by failing to evaluate/treat Zamora and to transfer full records; those breaches foreseeably led to the later shooting	Skagit’s § 319 duty to control ended with custody; no general duty to prevent future crimes after lawful release	Court held duty is limited to controlling the person during the custodial relationship; no general post-release prevention duty
Whether § 319 liability can be based on foreseeable post-release harms caused by failures during custody	Failures during custody foreseeably caused later violence; foreseeability creates material fact issues	Foreseeable recidivism is too broad; imposing liability for post-release crimes would expand § 319 beyond control	Court held foreseeable post-release crimes are not, as a matter of law, within the jail’s § 319 duty unless control-related breach during custody proximately caused the later harm
Whether Skagit’s alleged omissions could be treated as affirmative acts imposing independent duty under Restatement § 302B	Plaintiffs suggested some acts/omissions effectively created risk of third-party criminality	Skagit argued no affirmative act meeting § 302B standard occurred	Court noted § 302B could apply in other cases but found § 302B claim not before it and the record didn’t establish such an affirmative-act duty here
Whether proximate cause can be resolved on summary judgment	Plaintiffs: factual disputes about whether treatment/records would have averted the shooting; proximate cause is fact question	Skagit: plaintiffs’ causation theory speculative; no proof measures would have prevented the shooting	Court did not reach proximate-cause merits because it disposed of the case on duty; affirmed summary judgment for Skagit on duty grounds

Key Cases Cited

Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195 (1992) (adopting Restatement § 319 take-charge duty for parole officers)
Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421 (1983) (duty to control may lead to liability for harms occurring after release where breach during custody caused later harm)
Joyce v. Dep’t of Corr., 155 Wn.2d 306 (2005) (community corrections officers can have § 319 take-charge duty; liability for failure to supervise probationers)
Robb v. City of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 427 (2013) (discussing Restatement § 302B as potential independent duty for affirmative acts creating risk)
Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wn.2d 18 (2006) (recognizing § 319 duties extend to foreseeable victims of persons leaving custody)