Billy K. Roberts, Kelly L. Roberts, Holiday Island Dev. Corp. v. Holiday Island Suburban Improvement Dist. 1
559 S.W.3d 269
Ark. Ct. App.2018Background
- Appeal addressing interpretation and application of Ark. Code Ann. § 14-92-240 governing transition from appointment to election of suburban improvement-district commissioners and the nomination/election process.
- Dispute whether timeshare owners qualify as "property owners" under § 14-92-240(c) and thus are entitled to mailed notice and voting rights in commissioner elections.
- HISID argued timeshare owners should not receive individual votes (or that district could limit votes) because many fractional owners would produce absurd dilution of voting power.
- HISID promulgated election regulations adding qualifications: delinquency in assessments or utility bills disqualifies nominees/voters; in multiple ownership only first two deed names may vote; past-due assessments must be paid before the election closes.
- Trial court ruling reversed on appeal: appellate court analyzed statutory language, legislative intent, and related statutory provisions to resolve who is a "property owner" and whether HISID regulations exceeded authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether HISID must mail notice to each timeshare owner | Timeshare owners are property owners and must receive individual notice | HISID contends timeshare interests are not separate property owners for notice purposes | Held: Timeshare owners are "property owners" for § 14-92-240 and must receive individual notice |
| Whether timeshare owners are eligible voters and number of votes | Timeshare owners own an estate in real property and each owner gets one vote per commissioner position | HISID warns literal reading yields absurd results (many fractional owners diluting others) and points to subsection (b) treating timeshare votes through association | Held: Each individual timeshare owner is entitled to one vote per commissioner position under § 14-92-240(c)(2) |
| Whether HISID may add voter/nominee qualifications (delinquency, pay-before-close, name-limits) | Appellants: additional qualifications are invalid because statute specifies voter/nominee qualifications and vote allocation | HISID: district rules fall within board authority to establish rules under § 14-92-210 | Held: HISID exceeded its authority; the additional eligibility requirements are invalid |
| Whether the court should avoid the statute’s literal application because of absurd results | HISID: literal reading leads to absurd dilution and conflicts with legislative intent | Appellants: plain statutory text governs; legislature created distinct procedures where intended | Held: No absurdity sufficient to override clear statutory language; court applied plain meaning and noted subsection (b) uses a different, explicit rule for timeshare voting in a different context |
Key Cases Cited
- Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 386 S.W.3d 385 (Ark. 2012) (de novo review and rules for statutory interpretation)
- Nolan v. Little, 196 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004) (give words ordinary meaning; avoid literal interpretation that leads to absurd results)
- Walther v. FLIS Enters., Inc., 540 S.W.3d 264 (Ark. 2018) (use legislative history and related aids when statute is unclear)
- Crayton v. State, 543 S.W.3d 544 (Ark. App. 2018) (statute is ambiguous only if open to multiple reasonable constructions)