Billy Crutsinger v. Lorie Davis, Director
929 F.3d 259
| 5th Cir. | 2019Background
- Crutsinger was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death; Texas courts affirmed his conviction and denied state habeas relief.
- He sought investigative funding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f); the federal district court denied funding as to claims it viewed as procedurally barred.
- Crutsinger filed a federal habeas petition raising IATC and other claims; the district court adjudicated the undeveloped IATC claims on the merits and denied relief.
- After Martinez and later Ayestas, Crutsinger moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to vacate the habeas judgment, arguing the district court’s § 3599(f) funding analysis was legally defective.
- The district court treated the Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) and transferred it to the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit held the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not a successive habeas petition (vacating the transfer) but remanded because circuit precedent required a certificate of appealability determination before the court could treat the transfer/order as a COA request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Crutsinger’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is a “successive” habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) | Crutsinger: motion challenges non‑merits defect (district court’s § 3599 funding standard), so it is a Rule 60(b) motion, not a successive habeas application | State/District Court: motion effectively reasserts IATC relief and thus functions as a successive habeas petition | Court: Motion is not successive under Gonzalez v. Crosby; vacated transfer and returned case to district court |
| Whether a postjudgment change in law (e.g., Ayestas) can constitute extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen final habeas judgment | Crutsinger: Ayestas abrogated Circuit precedent on § 3599 and thus shows a defect in integrity that justifies reopening | State: a change in law alone is generally insufficient; Gonzalez suggests not every legal development is extraordinary | Court: Gonzalez suggests such a change ordinarily is not extraordinary; court remanded for district court to consider this issue in the first instance |
| Whether this court had jurisdiction to treat the district court’s transfer and Crutsinger’s filings as a request for a certificate of appealability (COA) | Crutsinger: COA requirement should not bar review of his Rule 60(b) motion presented to the district court | State: Fifth Circuit precedent requires a COA on the specific issue before this court | Held: Panel concluded it lacked jurisdiction to treat the transfer as a COA due to binding Fifth Circuit precedent and remanded to the district court for further proceedings |
| Standard for § 3599(f) funding after Ayestas and Martinez—whether petitioner must show merits to obtain funding | Crutsinger: requiring proof of claim merit before funding is circular and contrary to § 3599 and Ayestas; funding should be assessed on whether services are reasonably necessary and could enable overcoming procedural hurdles | State/District Court (pre‑Ayestas): petitioner must show a “substantial need” or a non‑procedurally‑barred viable claim before funding | Held: Court recognized Ayestas abrogated the Fifth Circuit’s “substantial need” gloss; remanded for district court to apply proper § 3599(f) and Rule 60(b)(6) analyses |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (Rule 60(b) motion that challenges nonmerits aspects of habeas proceeding is not a successive petition)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can establish cause for procedural default of trial IAC claims)
- Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (Fifth Circuit’s heightened “substantial need” standard for § 3599 funding was incorrect; courts must apply the statutory “reasonably necessary” standard)
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (Rule 60(b)(6) relief analysis may consider a wide range of factors including risk of injustice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Treviño v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (application of Martinez in Texas contexts)
- Black v. Davis, 902 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.) (procedural precedent on COA requirement for appeals involving Rule 60(b) matters)