92 A.3d 1253
Pa. Commw. Ct.2014Background
- Licensee was observed riding a bicycle on Sept. 15, 2011; officer saw him go through a steady red light and noted the bicycle lacked required lights/reflectors.
- Officer Lenz activated his patrol lights; Licensee initially waved him on, then stopped and produced an ignition interlock license.
- Officer Lenz detected an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and observed unsteady gait; Licensee refused field sobriety tests and was arrested for suspected DUI.
- Licensee refused chemical testing, stating he believed one cannot be prosecuted for DUI while riding a bicycle.
- DOT suspended Licensee’s operating privilege for 18 months under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(ii)(B)(I) based on a prior 2007 DUI conviction; Licensee appealed to the trial court, which upheld the suspension; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by not considering preliminary-hearing transcript testimony | Bilka: Preliminary-hearing testimony would undercut reasonable grounds and should be considered | DOT/trial court: Transcript was not offered into evidence at the license-suspension hearing and DOT had no opportunity to cross-examine there | Waiver applies; trial court properly declined to consider the preliminary-hearing transcript; no reversible error |
| Whether Officer Lenz had reasonable grounds to arrest and request chemical testing | Bilka: Officer’s own testimony (e.g., able to ride without swerving) negates reasonable grounds for DUI suspicion | Trial court/DOT: Observations (red-light violation, lack of lights/reflectors, odor of alcohol, slurred speech, unsteady gait) supported reasonable grounds | Courts found substantial evidence supporting reasonable grounds; finding was affirmed |
| Whether the Implied Consent Law (75 Pa.C.S. § 1547) applies to bicyclists | Bilka: Implied consent is tied to the driver’s license privilege for motor vehicles; bicycles require no license, so implied consent shouldn’t apply | DOT/trial court: 2004 amendments removed the word “motor” from §1547(a), and the Vehicle Code defines “vehicle” to include bicycles; operating privilege includes using a vehicle on a highway | Held that the statute’s language and definitions extend implied consent to operators of bicycles; Implied Consent Law applies |
| Whether statutory enhancement to an 18-month suspension was available | Bilka: (implicit) challenges the applicability of Implied Consent and enhancement when operating a bicycle | DOT: Licensee had a prior DUI conviction, satisfying statutory enhancement provision | Held enhancement applies; prior DUI conviction justified 18-month suspension |
Key Cases Cited
- Sitoski v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 11 A.3d 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (elements required to support an enhanced suspension under §1547(b)(1))
- Gasper v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 674 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (reasonable-grounds question is one of law based on trial-court fact findings)
- Kronenbitter v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 615 A.2d 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (a bicycle is a “vehicle” under the Vehicle Code)
- Masland v. Bachman, 374 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1977) (statutory language changes ordinarily indicate changed legislative intent)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 620 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. 1993) (bicycle treated as a vehicle for DUI prosecution)
- Driscoll, 401 A.2d 312 (Pa. 1979) (legislature presumed to intend every word of a statute to have effect)