Biggs v. cooper/brewer
234 Ariz. 515
Ariz. Ct. App.2014Background
- Arizona passed HB 2010 (A.R.S. § 36-2901.08) in June 2013, authorizing AHCCCS to impose an assessment on hospitals to fund the nonfederal share of Medicaid expansion.
- Plaintiffs: 36 state legislators, two constituents, and a taxpayer plaintiff challenged the law as an unauthorized tax that should have required two-thirds legislative approval under Ariz. Const. art. 9 § 22.
- Defendants: Governor and AHCCCS director moved to dismiss for lack of standing and argued art. 9 § 22(D) leaves determination of supermajority applicability to the legislature (a nonjusticiable political question).
- The superior court dismissed the case for lack of standing, concluding the legislature decides whether art. 9 § 22 applies.
- The court of appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction, reversed the trial court on legislative standing, affirmed denial of standing for the constituents and the taxpayer, and remanded for further proceedings without deciding the merits of whether HB 2010 falls within § 22.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether art. 9 § 22(D) vests the Legislature with sole authority to decide when § 22's supermajority requirement applies | § 22(D) does not displace constitutional limits; a bill that meets § 22(B) must follow the supermajority rule even if the Legislature omits the separate provision | § 22(D) makes inclusion of the separate provision an internal legislative decision; courts should not review (political question) | § 22(D) does not give the Legislature sole power to decide applicability; courts can interpret § 22 and enforce its requirements |
| Whether plaintiff legislators have standing to challenge the law as violating art. 9 § 22 | Legislators claim their votes were nullified if the statute required a supermajority but was enacted by a simple majority—a concrete injury similar to Coleman | Defendants rely on Raines/Bennett: individual legislators lack standing because alleged injury is loss of political power, not a personal right | Legislators have standing under Coleman-type theory: alleged constitutional deprivation of the weight of their votes is a particularized injury; remand for merits development |
| Whether the plaintiff constituents have standing to challenge the statute | Constituents argue they are harmed by the law and its effects | Defendants argue the constituents allege generalized injuries shared by the public and are fully represented politically | Constituents lack standing—no distinct and palpable injury beyond generalized grievance |
| Whether taxpayer Jenney has standing under A.R.S. §§ 35-212, -213 to enjoin/recover illegal payments | Taxpayer claims the statute unlawfully authorizes revenue collection and thus gives standing to prevent illegal payments | Defendants argue the statute does not create an identifiable expenditure or payment authority traceable to recoverable funds | Taxpayer lacks standing—statute does not create an identifiable expenditure power or particular payment to enjoin/recover |
Key Cases Cited
- Randolph v. Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423 (discretionary nature of special action jurisdiction)
- Dobson v. State ex rel. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, 233 Ariz. 119 (constitutional interpretation as appropriate for special action)
- Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520 (legislator standing principles; distinguishing Coleman and Raines)
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (loss of political power is generally insufficient for individual legislator standing)
- Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (legislators may have standing when their votes are effectively nullified)
- State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 189 Ariz. 269 (taxpayer/official standing to challenge statutory expenditure authority)
- Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65 (standards for waiving standing in matters of great public importance)
- Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221 (constitutional provisions as limitations on legislative power)