727 S.E.2d 769
S.C. Ct. App.2012Background
- Appellants contracted with Prevost for interior remodeling; a water leak caused damage and liability asserted for negligence and warranty.
- Prevost counterclaimed for contract-owed interest at a daily 1% rate; jury awarded Prevost $6,437.62 and prejudgment interest under the contract.
- Circuit court granted leave to deposit funds and held prejudgment interest at 1% daily, post-judgment interest at 11.25% per year.
- January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed prejudgment interest; remittitur followed; the case proceeded on remand for other issues.
- Appellants later moved to set the post-judgment interest rate; the circuit court declined, citing law-of-the-case restraints and lack of authority to modify the rate.
- This appeal challenges whether post-judgment interest rate is governed by law or contract and whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to reconsider it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the leave-to-deposit order set post-judgment interest as law of the case | Bickerstaff argues the order fixed post-judgment rate at 1% daily as law of the case. | Prevost contends the footnote limits the order to deposits and does not bind the post-judgment rate; the appellate court will determine the rate. | The post-judgment rate was not established by that order; appellate court determines rate. |
| Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to reconsider post-judgment interest | Circuit court retained jurisdiction over matters not affected by the first appeal. | Law-of-the-case doctrine bars altering the rate previously affirmed by the appellate court. | The circuit court had authority to reconsider post-judgment interest. |
| Whether the first appeal’s law-of-the-case affected post-judgment interest | The only issue on appeal was prejudgment interest; post-judgment rate was not decided there. | The appellate decision implicitly fixes post-judgment rate by contract if a rate existed. | Post-judgment interest issue was not resolved on the first appeal; reversed on that basis. |
| Whether constitutional claims regarding 1% daily rate were preserved | Argues 1% daily rate is punitive and unconstitutional; preservation should be excused due to appellate context. | Constitutional arguments were not raised below and are waived on appeal. | Constitutional claims were not preserved; not addressed on the merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Renaissance Enterprises, Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc., 326 S.C. 460, 483 S.E.2d 796 (Ct.App.1997) (statutory rate applies unless contract fixes a different rate)
- Renaissance Enterprises, Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc., 334 S.C. 324, 513 S.E.2d 617 (1999) (reaffirmation/extension of post-judgment interest principles)
- Turner Coleman, Inc. v. Ohio Construction & Engineering, Inc., 272 S.C. 289, 251 S.E.2d 738 (1979) (post-judgment interest framework under contract law)
- Bickerstaff v. Prevost, 380 S.C. 521, 670 S.E.2d 660 (Ct.App.2009) (first appeal limited to prejudgment interest; law-of-the-case noted)
- Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 633 S.E.2d 505 (2006) (preservation requirements for appellate review)
- State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998) (constitutional arguments and preservation principles)