Bey v. Trump
20-3380-cv
| 2d Cir. | Jun 23, 2021Background
- Pro se plaintiff Messiah Ali Bey sued Donald J. Trump (styled as "doing business as the United States") and the Estate of Abraham Lincoln on behalf of a Moorish organization, alleging the U.S. enslaved Moors and seeking injunctive relief and massive monetary damages.
- The district court sua sponte dismissed claims against Trump and the Lincoln Estate (presidential immunity) and dismissed claims against the United States (sovereign immunity); it also denied leave to amend.
- Bey moved for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), arguing his claims fell within a Tucker Act waiver of sovereign immunity; the district court denied the motion and Bey appealed that denial.
- The district court found monetary claims barred by sovereign immunity (constitutional claims) or unexhausted under the FTCA (nonconstitutional torts), and characterized Bey’s requested injunctive relief as frivolous based on implausible factual allegations.
- The court denied leave to amend as futile because the Tucker Act vests primary jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims and the Little Tucker Act limits district-court concurrent jurisdiction to claims under $10,000, while Bey sought far more.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sovereign immunity bars Bey's money-damages claims against the United States | Bey argued a Tucker Act waiver permitted his monetary claims | Government maintained sovereign immunity for constitutional torts and pointed to FTCA exhaustion requirements for nonconstitutional torts | Held: Sovereign immunity bars damages; constitutional torts not waived, and nonconstitutional torts require FTCA exhaustion that Bey did not satisfy |
| Whether FTCA exhaustion was required for nonconstitutional tort claims | Bey did not exhaust FTCA administrative remedies; argued Tucker Act waiver applied | Government argued FTCA exhaustion is jurisdictional and mandatory for nonconstitutional torts | Held: FTCA exhaustion is jurisdictional and Bey failed to comply, so such tort claims are barred |
| Whether Bey's requested injunctive relief was permissible | Bey sought broad injunctive relief based on allegations (e.g., genetic engineering, slave manufacturing) | Government characterized allegations as frivolous and speculative | Held: Injunctive claims were frivolous on their face and properly dismissed |
| Whether denial of leave to amend was proper given Tucker Act jurisdictional arguments | Bey sought remand to amend and assert Tucker Act claims | Government argued even amended Tucker Act claims would be futile because of forum and amount limits | Held: Denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion; Tucker Act claims belong in the Court of Federal Claims and the Little Tucker Act’s < $10,000 district-court cap precludes jurisdiction here given Bey’s massive damages demand |
Key Cases Cited
- Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992) (frivolous pleading standard)
- Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994) (sovereign immunity and constitutional-tort waiver analysis)
- Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (FTCA exhaustion is jurisdictional)
- Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2011) (courts need not entertain pure speculation/conjecture)
- Pfizer Inc. v. United States, 939 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2019) (Tucker Act vests jurisdiction in Court of Federal Claims)
- Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (Little Tucker Act’s district-court jurisdictional amount limit)
- Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (futility of amendment where substantive defect cannot be cured)
- Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (pro se litigant should be given leave to amend when complaint suggests a possibly valid claim)