Betty D. Bryant v. U.S. Steel Corporation, 428 F. App'x 895

Bryant filed an employment-discrimination action against U.S. Steel on March 2, 2009, after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter on November 25, 2008.
The complaint asserted five counts: sex discrimination (Title VII), retaliation (Title VII), retaliation under § 1981, discharge/undue medical-condition-related conduct under § 1981, and disability discrimination (ADA).
The district court granted summary judgment on all counts, holding untimeliness for Counts I, II, and V because suit was filed more than 90 days after the right-to-sue letter and struck Bryant’s affidavit deeming it a sham.
Counts III and IV were rejected as a matter of law.
Bryant appealed, challenging the striking of the affidavit and the timeliness, and arguing that she established prima facie retaliation under § 1981 and that the employer’s reasons were pretextual.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding no abuse of discretion in striking the affidavit, dismissing the time-barred claims, and rejecting Bryant’s § 1981 retaliation claims asuntimely and unpretextual.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the affidavit struck as a sham an abuse of discretion?	Bryant contends it established timely filing.	U.S. Steel argues the affidavit contradicted deposition without valid explanation.	No abuse; affidavit contradicted earlier testimony and lacked a refreshment basis.
Are Title VII and ADA claims time-barred by the 90-day limit?	Affidavit shows timely filing within 90 days.	Suit filed after 90 days; timely evidence stripped.	Time-bar dismissal affirmed; only the struck affidavit could support timeliness.
Do § 1981 retaliation claims require administrative exhaustion and can they survive summary judgment on the merits?	§ 1981 retaliation should proceed; claim supported by prima facie case and possible pretext.	Retaliation claim fails on the merits; district court’s reasoning stands.	§ 1981 retaliation claims not subject to Title VII exhaustion and fail on the merits.

Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (abuse-of-discretion standard for striking affidavits)
Van T. Junkins and Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1984) (sham affidavit rule requires valid explanation for new recollection)
Skyline Corp. v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980) (refreshing memory is not evidence)
Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2002) (burden-shifting framework for Title VII/ADA timeliness)
Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment standard and proof requirements)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (probative value and evidentiary standard for summary judgment)
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000) (pretext framework in retaliation cases)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for proving pretext)
Little v. United Tech. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (protected activity in retaliation analysis)
Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 (11th Cir. 2000) (summary-judgment standard and evidentiary review)
Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (material-adverse-action standard in retaliation claims)
Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2002) (timeliness standards for Title VII/ADA claims)