Betterman v. Montana
578 U.S. 437
SCOTUS2016Background
- Brandon Betterman pleaded guilty to bail-jumping in Montana and remained jailed for ~14 months before sentencing.
- Much of the delay resulted from institutional procedures: a nearly five-month presentence report, delayed rulings on presentence motions, and slow scheduling of a sentencing hearing.
- Betterman argued the postconviction delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; Montana Supreme Court rejected that claim.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split over whether the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause covers delay between conviction and sentencing.
- The Court limited its review to the Sixth Amendment claim (Betterman did not preserve a Due Process challenge) and affirmed the Montana Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause apply to postconviction delay between conviction (guilty plea/trial) and sentencing? | Betterman: sentencing delay of ~14 months violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right; modern plea-dominated system makes sentencing the critical forum. | Government/Montana: Clause protects from arrest/indictment through trial only; it detaches at conviction and does not cover sentencing delay. | Speedy Trial Clause does not apply after conviction; it protects only through conviction. |
| If Clause doesn't apply, is dismissal or other Sixth Amendment remedy appropriate for sentencing delay? | Betterman sought reduction of sentence by the delay period (time-served credit). | Government: Sixth Amendment remedy is dismissal of charges, a preconviction remedy inappropriate postconviction. | Sixth Amendment remedy (dismissal) is aimed at preconviction harms and generally not available postconviction. |
| Are there other constitutional or statutory protections against unreasonable sentencing delay? | Betterman suggested harm from delay but did not advance a due process claim here. | Court/Government: statutory rules, sentencing rules, and Due Process Clause may provide relief; many statutes/rules require prompt sentencing. | Court: While Speedy Trial Clause is inapplicable, defendants may have other remedies (statutory rules, Rule 32(b)(1), and potentially Due Process claims) — but Betterman forfeited any Due Process claim. |
| Should Barker v. Wingo factors govern delayed-sentencing due process claims? | (Raised in concurrence) Some Justices and circuits apply Barker factors to due process delayed-proceeding claims. | Others (concurring) prefer reserving the test, as due process is flexible and may allow other remedies (mandamus, statutes). | Court reserved the question; Justice Sotomayor concurred that Barker is a suitable flexible test but the issue is open for future cases. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial attaches at arrest or formal accusation and does not apply pre-arrest)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (multi-factor test for speedy-trial claims: length, reason, assertion, prejudice)
- Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (dismissal as remedy for Sixth Amendment speedy trial violations)
- United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (Due Process protects against fundamentally unfair prosecutorial delay pre-arrest)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (presumption of innocence and proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for guilt)
- United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010) (distinguishing trial elements from sentencing factors)
- Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (Speedy Trial Clause protects against delay in bringing unrelated charges to trial even for incarcerated persons)
- Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel extends to some postconviction proceedings)
- United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (Due Process analysis applied to delayed civil proceedings; illustrates use of Barker factors in other contexts)