Betancourt v. Phoenix, 1 CA-CV 16-0361

Background

In July 2012 Betancourt led Phoenix police on a ~60-mile pursuit in a stolen car, was stopped, exited the vehicle, and a confrontation ensued in which he was shot and sustained facial fractures and permanent vision loss allegations.
Officers testified Betancourt resisted and an officer struck him with a weapon; Betancourt testified he surrendered and an officer shot him from 10–15 feet, after which officers beat and restrained him.
Betancourt was later convicted of felonies arising from the incident and sentenced to 18 years; he then sued the City for assault and battery and negligence, alleging excessive force.
The City moved to dismiss and later for summary judgment, arguing (inter alia) immunity under A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B) (no liability for losses arising from an employee’s felony) and that Heck barred the claims; the trial court initially denied dismissal but later granted summary judgment after discovery based on § 12-820.05(B).
On appeal, the court considered whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prevented reconsideration of the denial of dismissal and whether § 12-820.05(B) barred Betancourt’s civil claims given the evidence developed in discovery.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the superior court was bound by its earlier denial of the City’s motion to dismiss under the law-of-the-case doctrine	The earlier denial that § 12‑820.05(B) did not apply is law of the case and bars granting summary judgment on same grounds	Court may reconsider earlier rulings when evidence changes; substantial new evidence exists after discovery	Denial at motion-to-dismiss was reconsidered because substantial new evidence (depositions, trial testimony, appellate decision) was developed; no law-of-the-case bar to summary judgment
Whether A.R.S. § 12‑820.05(B) immunizes the City from liability for injuries arising from an officer’s alleged conduct	§ 12‑820.05(B) does not apply because alleged excessive force could be non-felonious (accidental or negligent) or justified under § 13‑409	Officer’s shooting, under plaintiff’s version, would be an intentional or reckless act causing serious injury (aggravated assault), a felony; no evidence of mere negligence or propensity exists	The court held the officer’s conduct (if believed) would constitute aggravated assault; absent evidence of propensity, the City is immune under § 12‑820.05(B)
Whether a reasonable factfinder could infer negligence rather than intentional/reckless conduct from the record	Betancourt: the shooting might have been accidental or negligent, not felonious	City: record contains only two versions (intentional/reckless); no evidence supporting negligent discharge	No genuine dispute supports negligence theory; trier of fact cannot properly speculate; summary judgment proper
Whether other defenses (e.g., Heck v. Humphrey) required resolution	Betancourt challenged application of immunities and constitutional issues (raised later)	City argued Heck would also bar civil claims attacking convictions	Court declined to reach Heck because § 12‑820.05(B) immunity disposed of the case

Key Cases Cited

Gallagher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 237 Ariz. 254 (App. 2015) (interpreting § 12‑820.05(B) as insulating public entities from employee felony acts)
Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275 (App. 1993) (law-of-the-case as procedural doctrine for same-court reconsideration)
Hall v. Smith, 214 Ariz. 309 (App. 2007) (reconsideration appropriate when substantial change in evidence occurs)
Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16 (App. 1996) (summary judgment review standard and de novo review)
Johnson v. Pankratz, 196 Ariz. 621 (App. 2000) (elements of assault and battery)
Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141 (2007) (elements of negligence in Arizona)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (civil claims that would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction may be barred)